THE HUMAN BASIS OF LAWS AND ETHICS Without God, how can you be moral? by Frederick Edwords
THE HUMAN BASIS OF LAWS AND ETHICS
Without God, how can you be moral?
by Frederick Edwords
There is a tendency on the part of many theists to assume
that the burden of proof is on the nontheist when it comes to the
issue of morality. Thus, the individual who operates without a
theological base is asked to justify his so doing -- the
assumption of the theist being that no morality is possible in the
absence of some form of "higher" law.
In our culture, people are so accustomed to the idea of every
law having a lawmaker, every rule having an enforcer, every
institution having someone in authority, and so forth, that the
thought of something being otherwise has the ring of chaos to it.
As a result, when one lives one's life without reference to some
ultimate authority in regard to morals, one's values and
aspirations are thought to be arbitrary. Furthermore, it is often
argued that, if everyone tried to live in such a fashion, no
agreement on morals would be possible and there would be no way to
adjudicate disputes between people, no defense of a particular
moral stand being possible in the absence of some absolute point
of reference.
But all of this is based on certain unchallenged assumptions
of the theistic moralist -- assumptions that are frequently the
product of faulty analogies. It will be my purpose here to take a
fresh look at these assumptions. I will try to show the actual
source from which values are originally derived, provide a solid
foundation for a human-based (humanistic) moral system, and then
place the burden on the theist to justify any proposed departure.
LAWS AND LAWMAKERS
Unthinkingly, people often assume that the universe is run in
a fashion similar to human societies. They recognize that humans
are able to create order by creating laws and by establishing
means of enforcement. So, when they see order in the universe,
they imagine that this order had a similar humanlike source. This
anthropomorphic viewpoint is a product of the natural pride that
human beings take in their ability to put meaning into their
world. It is, ironically, a subtle recognition of the fact that
human beings are the actual source of values and, hence, any
"higher" set of values that might be placed above ordinary human
aims must emanate from a source similar to, but greater than,
ordinary human beings. In short, superhuman values must be
provided by a superhuman -- there being simply no other way the
deed can be done.
But, while such an anthropomorphic viewpoint is an outgrowth
of human self-esteem, it is also evidence of a certain lack of
imagination. Why is it that the only source for higher morals
must be a superhuman being? Why not something totally unfamiliar
and incomprehensibly superior?
Some theologians do try to claim that their god is indeed
incomprehensible. However, even then, they fail to escape human
analogies and use such terms as "law giver," "judge," and the
like. Clearly, the picture that emerges from religious and
even some secular moral philosophy is that, just as conventional
laws require lawmakers, morals require an ultimate source of
morality.
A related, unchallenged assumption is that moral values, in
order to be binding, must come from a source outside of human
beings. Again the analogy of law, judges, and police crops up.
In daily life, we obey laws seemingly created by others, judged by
others, and enforced by others. Why should moral rules be any
different?
FAULTY ASSUMPTIONS
When a lawmaker is said to be needed for every law, the
result is an endless series, since someone must be the lawmaker of
the lawmaker's laws. Because such a series is uncomfortable to
moral philosophers and theologians, at some point they declare
that "the buck stops here." They argue for an ultimate lawmaker,
one who has no one who makes laws for him. And how is that done?
The point is made that the buck has to stop somewhere, and a
supernatural god is thought to be as good a stopping place as any.
But still the question can be asked: "From where does God
get his (or her) moral values?" If God gets them from a still
higher source, the buck hasn't stopped, and we are back to our
endless series. If they originate with God, then God's morals are
made up and hence arbitrary. If analogy is to be used to
establish God as a source of morals because all morals need an
intelligent moral source, then, unfortunately for the theist, the
same analogy must be used to show that, if God makes morals up
"out of the blue," God is being just as arbitrary as are human
beings who do the same thing. As a result, we gain no advantage
and hence are no more compelled philosophically to obey God's
arbitrary morals than we are to obey the morals established by our
best friend or even our worst enemy. Arbitrary is arbitrary, and
the arbitrariness is in no way removed by making the arbitrary
moralizer supernatural, all-powerful, incomprehensible,
mysterious, or anything else usually attributed to God. So, in
this case, if God exists, God's values are just God's opinions and
need not necessarily concern us.
While this first assumption -- the need for a lawmaker --
fails to solve the problem which it was intended to solve, the
second assumption -- that the source of moral values must lie
outside of human beings -- actually stands in the way of finding
the answer. The second assumption is based upon the superficial
awareness that laws seem to be imposed upon us from without. And
from this it follows that there needs to be an external imposer of
morality. But what is so often forgotten is that those human laws
that appear externally imposed are actually, at least in the
Western world, the product of a democratic process. They are the
laws of the governed. And, if it is possible for people to
develop laws and impose those laws upon themselves, then it is
possible to do the same with morality. As in law, so in morals;
the governed are capable of rule.
AN ABSOLUTE POINT OF REFERENCE
At this point, it can be asked: how is it possible that the
governed are able to rule themselves? Might they not all be
tapping into some ultimate, higher, or absolute point of
reference? Might not human laws and conventions simply be
specific applications of the laws of God? Let's look and see.
Suppose I am driving in my car and I come to a red light. If
I wish to turn right, and it is safe to do so in this situation,
then in most states I can proceed without fear of punishment. But
what if I do it where it is not legal or safe? Then it is
possible that a police officer will ticket me. Is the police
officer, and the court system backing up the ticket, an external
imposition on me? Yes, but, ultimately, the laws affecting
traffic were made by people much like me and can be changed by me
and others working in concert. So the law regulating how I
operate when wishing to turn right on a red light is totally a
human invention to solve a human problem.
But could this human convention be based upon a higher law to
which I and others must refer? I can't see how. None of the
ancient and venerable holy books discuss turning right on a red
light or offer some higher principle from which all traffic laws
are to be or can reasonably be derived. Not even the golden rule
offers any guidance here, since that merely tells me to obey
whatever the law is, if it is a law I want others to obey. It
doesn't tell me if turning right on a red light should be legal or
not, or if the light for "stop" should be red and not purple, or
anything else useful here. When it comes to traffic regulations,
human beings are on their own with nowhere to turn for super-
natural guidance in how best to formulate the rules of the road.
(This does not mean that traffic regulations are totally
arbitrary, however. They are, after all, based upon
considerations of survival. They exist because of a human concern
for safety. As a result, a number of important discoveries of
physics are taken into account when setting speed limits and the
like. The facts of nature, in this case, become an external point
of reference, but a God still does not figure in the process.)
Now why, if human beings are not supposed to be able to
function well without an external and supernatural basis for their
conduct, are so many people so capable of obeying and enforcing
traffic regulations? It should be obvious from the most casual
observation that human beings are quite capable of setting up
systems and then operating within them.
Once this is seen, it can be asked what grounds exist for the
belief that human beings cannot continue to operate in this
fashion when it comes to laws and moral teachings regulating such
things as trade and commerce, property rights, interpersonal
relationships, sexual behavior, religious rituals, and the rest of
those things that theologians seem to feel are in need of a
theological foundation. The mere fact that ancient and revered
holy books make pronouncements on these matters and attribute such
pronouncements to divine moral principles no more makes theology a
necessity for law and morality than it would make it a necessity
for playing baseball had those rules appeared in these ancient
works. * If we can obey our own traffic laws without the need of
a theological or metaphysical base, we are as capable of obeying
our own rules in other areas. Comparable considerations of human
need and interest, in harmony with the facts, can be applied in
both cases to the inventing of the best laws and rules by which to
live. Therefore, we can apply to laws what the astronomer Laplace
said to Napoleon: in the matter of a god, we have "no need for
that hypothesis."
LAW AND MORALITY
Law, however, is not necessarily the same as morality; there
are many moral rules that are not regulated by human legal
authorities. And so the question arises as to how one can have a
workable set of moral guidelines if there is no one to enforce
them. Laws and rules are generally designed to regulate
activities that can be publicly observed. This makes enforcement
easy. But breeches of moral principles are a horse of a different
color. They often involve acts that are not illegal but simply
unethical and can include acts that are private and difficult to
observe without invading that privacy. Enforcement, therefore, is
almost totally left to the perpetrator. Others may work on the
perpetrator's emotions to encourage guilt or shame, but they have
no actual control over the perpetrator's conduct.
To solve this problem, some theologians have given God the
attribute of "cosmic spy" and the power to punish the unethical
behavior which the law misses -- a power that extends even beyond
the grave. So even if God's arbitrariness is granted, there would
be no denying God's power to enforce his (or her) will. Thus, to
the extent that this God and this power were real, there would
exist a potent stimulus -- though not a philosophical
justification -- for people to behave according to the divine
wishes. And this would at least take most of the uncertainty out
of the enforcement of moral, but not unlawful, behavior.
Unfortunately for those advancing this proposal, the
existence of this authority is not as apparent as the existence of
human authorities which enforce public laws. Thus, in order to
control lawful but immoral behavior, clergy through the ages have
found it necessary to harangue, cajole, browbeat, and in other
ways condition their flocks into belief in this supreme arbiter of
moral conduct. They have sought to condition children from as
early an age as possible. And with both adults and children, they
have appealed to the imagination by painting graphic word pictures
of the tortures of the damned.
The ancient Romans claimed some success with these measures,
and the ancient historian Polybius, comparing Greek and Roman
beliefs and the levels of corruption in each culture, concluded
that Romans were less inclined to theft because they feared
hellfire. For reasons such as this, the Roman statesman Cicero
regarded the Roman religion as useful, even while holding it to be
false.
But do human beings really need such sanctions in order for
them to control their private behavior? Almost never. For if
such sanctions were of primary importance, they would almost
always be used by moralists and preachers. But they are not.
Today, when arguments for moral behavior are made, even by the
most conservative of religious preachers, the appeal is rarely to
God's present or future punishments. The appeal is more
frequently to such practical considerations as psychological
well-being, good reputation, effective reaching of one's goals,
and promotion of the public weal. Appeals are also made to
conscience and natural human feelings of sympathy. In
Christianity, sometimes fear is replaced by the motive of
imitating Christ's ideal, a general approach established
earlier in Buddhism. It is significant that all of these appeals
can influence the behavior of the nontheist as well as that of the
theist.
But suppose that theists were to cease such practical and
humanistic appeals and return to basing every moral preachment on
God's will. One disturbing irony would remain: there are many
different gods. ** The simple fact that religions the world over
are capable of promoting similar moral behavior puts the lie to
the idea that only a certain god is the one "true" dispenser of
morality. If only one of the many gods believed in is
real, millions of people, though behaving morally, must be doing
it under the influence, inspiration, or orders of the WRONG GOD.
Belief in the "right" god, then, must not be very critical in the
matter of moral conduct. One can even stand with Cicero and avow
hypocrisy and get the same result. And when one adds that
nontheists the world over have shown themselves to be just as
capable of private moral behavior as theists (Buddhists offering
perhaps the best large-scale example), then belief in God turns
out to be a side issue in this whole matter. There is something
in human nature operating at a deeper level than mere theological
belief, and it is this that serves as the real prompt for moral
behavior. As with laws, so with morals: human beings seem quite
capable of making, on their own, sensible and sensitive decisions
affecting conduct.
THE SOURCE OF MORALITY
But does this completely solve the problem posed by the
theist? No, it does not. For the question can still be raised as
to how it is possible for human beings to behave morally, agree on
moral rules and laws, and generally cooperate with each other in
the absence of any divine impetus in this direction. After all,
haven't modern philosophers, in particular analytical
philosophers, argued that moral statements are basically emotional
utterances without a rational base? And haven't they split "is"
irrevocably from "ought" so that no foundation is even possible?
In the light of this, how is it that human beings manage to agree,
often from culture to culture, on a variety of moral and legal
principles? And, of more interest, how is it possible for legal
and moral systems to improve over the centuries in the absence of
the very rational or theological footing that modern philosophers
have so effectively taken away? Without some basis, some
objective criteria, it isn't possible to choose a good moral
system over a bad one. If both are equally emotive and
irrational, they are both equally arbitrary -- making any
selection between them only a product of accidental leanings or
willful whim. No choice could be rationally defended.
And yet, seemingly in spite of this problem, human beings do
develop moral and legal systems on their own and later make
improvements on them. What is the explanation? From whence do
moral values come?
Let's imagine for a moment that we have the earth, lifeless
and dead, floating in a lifeless and dead universe. There are
only mountains, rocks, gullies, winds, and rain, but no one
anywhere to make judgements as to good and evil. In such a world
would good and evil exist? Would it make any moral difference if
a rock rolled down a hill or if it didn't? Richard Taylor in his
book, Good and Evil, has argued effectively that a "distinction
between good and evil could not even theoretically be drawn in a
world that we imagined to be devoid of all life."
Now, following Taylor, let's add some beings to this planet.
However, let us make them perfectly rational and devoid of all
emotion, totally free of all purposes, needs, or desires. Like
computers, they simply register what is going on, but they make no
moves to ensure their own survival or avoid their own destruction.
Do good and evil exist now? Again, there is no theoretical way in
which they can. These beings don't care what goes on; they merely
observe. And thus they have no rationale for declaring a thing
good or evil. Nothing matters to them and, since they are the
only beings in the universe, nothing matters at all.
Enter Adam. Adam is a man who is fully human. He has
deficiencies, and hence needs. He has longings and desires. He
can experience pain and pleasure and often avoids the former and
seeks the latter. Things matter to him. He can ask of a given
thing, "Is this for me or against me?" and come to some
determination.
At this point, and only at this point, do good and evil
appear. Furthermore, as Taylor argues, "the judgements of this
solitary being concerning good and evil are as ABSOLUTE as any
judgement can be. Such a being is, indeed, the measure of all
things: of good things as good and of bad things as bad. . . .
No distinction can be made, in terms of this being, between what
is merely good for HIM and what is good ABSOLUTELY; there is no
higher standard of goodness. For what could it be?" Apart from
Adam's wants and needs, there is only that dead universe. And,
without him, good and evil could not exist.
Now let's bring another being into the picture, a being who,
though having many needs and interests in common with Adam, has
some that differ slightly. We will call her Eve. Interesting
things begin to happen at this point. For, on the one hand, we
have two people with similar aims who are capable of working
together for a common cause. On the other hand, we have two
people who need to compromise with each other in order that each
will be able to satisfy the other's unique desires. And so a
complex interpersonal relationship develops, and rules are
established to maximize mutual satisfaction and to minimize the
effects of evil. With rules, we now have right and wrong. And
from this basic recognition of the need for cooperation
ultimately come laws and ethics.
But now let us suppose that these two people come to a fierce
disagreement over the best way to perform a desired action. The
two argue and seem to get nowhere. And then Adam pulls his trump
card. He says to Eve, "Wait a minute. Aren't we forgetting about
God?" And to this Eve replies, "Who?" Adam now has his opening
and proceeds to go into a long explanation about how all moral
values would be arbitrary if it weren't for God; how God was the
one who made good things good and bad things bad; and how our
knowledge of good and evil, right and wrong, moral and immoral
must be based on the absolute moral standards established in
heaven. Well, this is all new to Eve, and so she asks Adam, who
seems to know so much about it, to provide a little more detail on
these absolute standards. And so Adam goes into another long
explanation about the laws of God and God's punishments for
disobedience, until he arrives at the issue which started the
whole discussion in the first place. And thereupon Adam
concludes, "And so you see, Eve, God says to do it MY way!" Such
is the manner in which appeals to divine absolutes settle moral
and other disputes between people.
LESS THAN ABSOLUTE POINTS OF REFERENCE
So we can see that without living beings with needs, there
can be no good or evil. And without the presence of more than one
such living being, there can be no rules of conduct. Morality,
then, emerges from humanity precisely because it exists to serve
humanity. Theology attempts to step outside this system, even
though there is no need (beyond coercion) for such a move.
When theologians imagine that human beings, without some
theologically derived moral system, would be without any points of
reference upon which to anchor their ethics, they forget the
following factors which most humans share in common:
1. Normal human beings share the same basic survival and growth
needs. We all belong to the same species and reproduce our own
kind. So it should come as no surprise to anyone that we can have
common interests and concerns.
2. Sociobiologists are learning that important human behaviors
which seem to persist across cultural lines may be rooted in the
genes. Therefore, many of the most basic features of culture and
civilization could be natural to our species. Certainly
paleoanthropology helps to bear this out when it is recognized
that the oldest hominids known show evidence of having been social
animals. And our similarities to living apes involve more than
mere appearance. Many of our behaviors are similar as well. The
existence of certain genetic behaviors, therefore, makes agreement
between people on laws, institutions, customs, and morals far less
surprising. We humans are not infinitely malleable, and hence our
laws and institutions are not as arbitrary as once thought.
3. Most normal human beings respond with similar feelings of
compassion to like events. Our values are not all based on simple
individual self-interest or egoism. There are clear cases in
which our self-interest would not be served by, say, helping a
suffering animal, and yet we often respond to such a situation and
applaud others who do likewise. These normal compassionate
responses repeatedly crop up in our literature, institutions, and
laws. Thus it is clear that our morals are in large part a
product of our common emotional responses, thereby allowing us to
propose improvements in those morals by making appeals to the
feelings of our fellows.
4. We share the same planetary environment with other humans.
If we add the fact that we already share needs in common, we are
fraught with common problems and enjoy common pleasures. We share
similar experiences and therefore can easily identify with one
another and share similar goals.
5. We share the same laws of physics, and those laws affect us in
common ways. In particular, they affect us when we wish to do
something. We find that we all have to take into account
identical problems when building a structure, planning a road, or
planting a crop.
6. The rules of logic and evidence apply equally well to
everyone, and so we have a common means of arguing cases and
discussing issues -- a means that allows us to compare notes and
come to agreement in areas as varied as science, law, and history.
We can use reason and observation as a "court of appeal" when
setting forth opposing viewpoints.
For these and other reasons, it should not appear strange
that human beings can find common ground on the issue of moral
values without having to appeal to, or even have knowledge of, a
divine set of rules. In fact, ironically, once religiously based
rules are brought into any dispute, especially if there is more
than one religious view present, the more the religious arguments
are used the less agreement there is. This is because many
religiously and theologically based values do not relate to each
other or the actual human condition or the science of the world.
Such values are said to come from a "higher" source. And so, when
these "higher" sources disagree with each other or with human
nature, there is no way to adjudicate the dispute, because the
point of reference is based upon a unique faith-commitment to
something invisible, not to a common range of experience.
It is theological values, then, and not human-oriented
values, that are the most baseless. For, with theological values,
an arbitrary leap of faith must be taken at some point. And once
that arbitrary leap has been taken, all values so derived are as
arbitrary as the leap of faith that made them possible.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF
So, it is not the humanist who needs to offer an explanation
for value. What explanation could be needed for the fact that
people naturally pursue human interests and thus relate laws and
institutions to human concerns? It is only when someone seeks to
depart from this most natural of pursuits that any questions need
be raised. It is only when someone posits a law higher than what
is good for humanity that doubts need be expressed. For it is
here than an explanation or justification of a moral base makes
sense. The burden of proof belongs on the one who steps outside
the ordinary way in which morals are derived -- not on the one who
continues to keep his or her morals, laws, and institutions
relevant, useful, and democratically produced.
--------------------------------
FOOTNOTES:
* Baseball is also a useful case in point. Suppose I am playing
this game and I have three strikes against me. The umpire calls
me "out" and I must leave the plate. This seems like an
imposition from without. But the rules of the game were invented
quite arbitrarily by people like me, and I entered the game with
the tacit agreement that I would play according to those rules.
Thus the rules are a completely human convention, having, and in
fact needing, no metaphysical or theological base. Yet I and the
other players easily abide by them, sometimes doing so quite
"religiously." This latter situation would suggest that human
beings are inherently a rule-making species.
** People of other faiths, continuing to preach the will of other
gods, would find themselves morally benefited in essentially the
same way as Christians.
ADDITIONAL COMMENTARY:
Moral Education
To the extent that the points in the above article are either
consciously or unconsciously understood, it becomes possible to
directly formulate improved ways of promoting moral behavior.
That is, when people agree on how human values are actually
derived, they are better able to stimulate relevant areas and
develop curricula in moral education that can prove increasingly
useful and effective.
In particular, by understanding that the survival of our
species is a common interest, and that we share common
requirements for survival, we can go a long way toward promoting
cooperation. We are further enabled to educate others about
relevant survival factors, such as health and hygiene.
The study of anthropology and biology teach us our
interconnectedness with varying human cultures and the whole
animal kingdom, thereby allowing us to learn things about
ourselves that inform the development of our ethical, moral, and
legal systems. Such systems, when so derived, then meet our needs
more effectively and reduce strife.
Because we share common passions, the role of moral education
need not limit itself to focusing on useful and practical rules of
conduct. It is enabled to turn itself additionally to the
development of helpful emotions. For example, compassion is
fostered and developed through educational programs where students
have opportunities to experience what it's like to be, say,
paralyzed, blind, or deaf. A good part of compassion seems to be
the ability to identify with those who suffer -- so this ability,
if developed further, can enable society to produce a generation
of young people who are more respectful of the rights of others,
more helpful in situations calling for altruistic behavior, and
more just in their dealings with people in general.
Science that provides improved knowledge of our world allows
us to come to more informed decisions about dealing with the
environment. Rational laws and practices are thus more likely.
Education in logic and other aspects of reasoning allows
people to better analyze situations and to come to less biased
decisions on matters of policy.
In short, a liberal education appears to provide excellent
moral training because it offers the knowledge and sophistication
necessary to continue the ongoing trial-and-error process of
finding better ways to live and cooperate.
Situation Ethics
Since the process of improving ethics IS a trial-and-error
one, then it is reasonable to keep ethical principles flexible.
After all, if a given principle is rigid and absolutistic, it
tends to foster a kind of idolatry where people worship the
rule instead of its intent. Since good and evil are ultimately
judged from human need and interest, then it only makes sense for
all moral principles to work toward meeting human needs and
serving human interests -- as opposed to becoming ends in
themselves.
Believing, on the other hand, that moral values come from God
has inspired many throughout history to practice idolatry with
moral principles.
For example, in an effort to follow the commandment to keep
the Sabbath (wherein the Bible specifically declares that one
shall not do work on that day nor have any servants or animals
work either), many have supported Sunday closing laws. Yet, even
when such laws are in effect, vital services, such as those of
medical and law enforcement, are kept operative. A truly absolute
practice of this commandment would require that even THOSE
services be shut down and given a day of rest. This inconsistency
is clearly in response to actual human needs, which become, in
practice, more important than the absolute rule. A position that
is therefore both consistent and moral is one where Sunday closing
laws are abandoned altogether, such laws being, at best, useless
and at worst, harmful.
The simple commandment, "Thou shalt not kill," admits of
numerous exceptions, which believers readily embrace, such as
self-defense, killing of animals, killing of germs, and so forth.
Re-translation of the commandment so that it reads, "Thou shalt
commit no murder" doesn't solve the problem because the
commandment fails to define "murder," which, in ordinary language,
is just whatever form of killing happens currently to be unlawful.
By this criterion, abortion, not being legally declared murder,
could not constitute breaking the commandment. So, there is no
getting around the fact that differing denominations of Christians
and Jews variously interpret this command to allow and disallow
capital punishment, vivisection, war, self-defense, abortion,
euthanasia, and vaccinations. A simple rule to never kill cannot
be followed and the result is always a catalogue of cases where it
is and is not all right to take a life. This is, in effect,
situation ethics, meaning that the rule has de facto already been
abandoned.
"Thou Shalt Not Steal" is a similar rule. It isn't practiced
absolutely, either. For example, in wartime, and even in peace,
national secrets are constantly stolen from one nation by agents
of another as part of security efforts. And these thefts are
supported frequently by believers in this commandment. Further,
we can ask if kleptomania constitutes a breaking of this rule,
since we may be entitled to excuse the action on the ground of
emotional illness.
But the most telling problem of absolutistic systems like the
Ten Commandments is that any time there is more than one absolute
rule, conflicts between the rules are possible. Thus, one can ask
if it is appropriate to kill to prevent a theft. Can you rob to
prevent a killing? Should you lie if you have good reason to
believe the truth will cause the recipient to die of a heart
attack? Is it appropriate to lie to keep from being killed? Can
you break the Sabbath to save someone's life? Would you steal a
car if you knew it would prevent the owner from working on the
Sabbath or killing someone? Should you honor the request of your
father and mother if they ask you to break any of the other
commandments? Would you rob from your father and mother if doing
so could prevent a murder? All kinds of dilemmas like this are
possible.
Which shows that we cannot live by absolute, abstract
principles. We need to relate them to life and human needs -- and
our best judges and juries do just that. This is where human
compassion comes in. This is why there exists within the law
varying degrees of murder, and why motive is such an important
issue in deciding criminal penalties.
These practices are reasonable because the nature of the
world doesn't lend itself easily to bipolar, either-or, types of
determinations. Things admit of degrees. Absolute morals attempt
to ignore such distinctions. Applying what perhaps could be
termed a "digital" (yes, no) moral system to an "analog" world can
only result in a poor fit. The two don't go well together. Of
course, either-or laws DO exist in such areas as traffic
regulations. This is because they have proven themselves useful
in being easy to remember when reflex action is a common
necessity. But inappropriate traffic laws HAVE been changed when
they proved unworkable. I would suggest that the overriding
principle is the long-range service of humanity -- and this is
true even when people apply what they imagine are "absolute"
standards.
In sum, there is nothing to be feared from the loss of
absolutes. They never really existed. Chaos does not reign.
Instead, trial-and-error efforts to sharpen laws, render
institutions more effective, and fit moral principles better to
improved knowledge of human nature continues. The genuine human
needs and concerns that led to the formulation of the Ten
Commandments and other such supposed absolutes has also fueled
their greater sophistication within our vast body of changing laws
and ethics.
The Goal
When we realize that right and wrong cannot exist without
beings with needs, and that human beings have proven themselves
capable of devising and then abiding by their own rules, then
there is no longer any way to deny that the pursuit of human
interest, for the individual and for society, for the short and
for the long run, is the broad goal of laws and ethics. Further,
this does not really need an explanation or justification, except
to those who have lost sight of the actual basis for their own
values. That is, no one needs to be asked why he or she pursues
his or her own interests, and no planet of people needs to be
asked why it seeks to pursue common goals. Only when people try
to depart from this most automatic of pursuits, only when someone
posits a law higher than what is good for humanity, need any
questions be raised -- for it is only THEN that an explanation or
justification of a moral base is necessary.
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This is the text of "The Human Basis of Laws and Ethics" as it
appeared in the May/June 1985 issue of The Humanist -- though
footnotes and commentary expanding selected points have been
adapted from the, longer, original manuscript. The latter was
first presented in January 1985 as a paper at, "Christianity
Challenges the University: An International Conference of Theists
and Atheists," sponsored by a group of evangelicals and held in
Dallas, Texas. The author is the executive director of the
American Humanist Association.
(c) Copyright 1985 by Frederick Edwords
So long as profit is not your motive and you always include this
copyright notice, please feel free to reproduce and distribute
this material in electronic form as widely as you please.
Nonprofit humanist and freethought publications have additional
permission to publish this in print form. All other permission
must be sought from the author through the American Humanist
Association, which can be contacted at the following address:
AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSOCIATION
PO BOX 1188
AMHERST NY 14226-7188
Phone: (800) 743-6646
E-Mail Fredric L. Rice / The Skeptic Tank