(This is the text of the December 9, 1994 District of Columbia Court Of Appeals decision i

(This is the text of the December 9, 1994 District of Columbia Court
Of Appeals decision in Uri Geller vs. James Randi and CSICOP as it
appeared in Skeptical Briefs, Vol. 4, No.4 December 1994. Thanks to
Barry Karr for providing machine readable copy for us to use - as a
concrete thank you I've left in the appeal for funds at the
end. Please remember that the Randi fund and the CSICOP fund are
completely independent - Randi will not be able to benefit from any
monies you contribute to CSICOP. Perhaps you would rather contribute
to Randi---you can send contributions to:

	3555 West Reno Street
	Suite L
	Las Vegas, NV 89118

This is the office of Penn & Teller, Randi's guardian angels.

Scott Ballantyne
moderator geller-hotline)

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Before Wald, Sentelle, and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge  Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: Appellant Uri Geller challenges the district court's
award of monetary sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (``Rule 11'') in favor of appellee Committee for the Scientific
Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal. Geller contends that the district
court erred when it treated a motion for Rule 11 sanctions as conceded by
Geller under local rules and thus awarded sanctions. Because we hold that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning appellant under Rule
11, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant Uri Geller, a citizen of Israel and a permanent resident of England,
is a self-proclaimed psychic who uses his putative ``powers'' to accomplish
such remarkable feats as reading minds or bending spoons and suspending
cable-cars in mid-air with nothing but sheer mental force. Geller has built a
career and reputation on attempted demonstrations of these psychic ``skills,''
appearing on numerous television programs such as ``The Tonight Show
with Johnny Carson'' and being featured in countless newspaper and
magazine articles. Among Geller's critics is James Randi, an accomplished
magician, author and lecturer, better known as ``The Amazing Randi.'' Randi
was a founding member of the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of
Claims of the Paranormal (``CSICOP''), an organization dedicated to
investigating, among other things, claims of psychic phenomena such as
those made by Geller. Since Geller's rise to prominence in the early 1970's,
Randi has set about exposing various Geller feats as the fraudulent tricks of a
confidence man.

In an April 9, 1991, article in the International Herald Tribune, Randi
discussed Geller's claimed psychic abilities, stating that Geller ``tricked even
reputable scientists'' with tricks that ``are the kind that used to be on the back
of cereal boxes when I was a kid. Apparently scientists don't eat cornflakes
anymore.'' Based solely upon these statements, Geller filed suit against both
Randi and CSICOP in United States District Court, alleging defamation, false
light invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with prospective
advantage. The original complaint did not attribute any specific conduct to
CSICOP; however, Geller amended his complaint to allege that ``Defendant
Randi was acting individually on his own behalf and/or as a duly authorized
actual and/or apparent agent, servant, employee and/or representative of the
Defendant, CSICOP.''

On January 15, 1992, eight months after Geller filed suit in district court,
CSICOP filed motions for summary judgment and Rule 11 sanctions against
Geller. In support of its motion for sanctions, CSICOP argued that Geller
could not have reasonably believed that his complaint was well grounded in
fact or warranted by law and that the complaint was filed for purposes of
harassing CSICOP. Geller responded on January 29, 1992, by filing a motion
for extension of time to oppose CSICOP's motions---presumably in order to
give Geller additional time for discovery. The district court granted Geller's
motion and ordered him to respond to CSICOP's motions by March 13, 1992.
When the deadline arrived on March 13, Geller filed another motion for an
extension of time until ten days after he received a transcript of a deposition
of CSICOP's corporate representative conducted that day. The district court
never ruled on that motion. Instead, attorneys for both parties agreed at a
later deposition attended by Geller that Geller's request for a ten-day extension
of time would lapse on April 29, 1992. Geller did not file a response by that
date. On May 28, 1992, CSICOP filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental
memorandum in support of its motions. CSICOP served this motion and the
accompanying memorandum upon Geller, who again failed to respond.

After Geller failed to respond to either the summary judgment or sanctions
motion, CSICOP moved on June 10, 1992, for expedited consideration of both
motions. Again, CSICOP served its motion upon Geller's counsel, who
neither opposed it nor took any farther steps with respect to the underlying
motions for summary judgment and Rule 11 sanctions. On July 2, 1992, the
district court granted all of CSICOP's motions, including the Rule 11 sanctions
motion, as ``unopposed.'' Shortly thereafter, Geller filed successive motions
for reconsideration, arguing that it was ``inappropriate'' to respond to
CSICOP's motions because the district court had not ruled on its second
motion for extension of time. The district court denied both motions for
reconsideration, noting that its failure to rule on the second motion for
extension of time did not relieve Geller's counsel of the duty to file
opposition within the time required by local and federal rules. The district
court explained that when Geller failed to respond to the summary judgment
and sanctions motions, both motions were properly treated as conceded
under C, Local Rule 108(b), which provides that a motion may be treated as
conceded if it is not answered within 11 days of the date of service. D.D.C. R.
108(b). Because Geller had not adequately explained his failure to respond, he
was not entitled to reconsideration.

After denying Geller's second motion for reconsideration on July 27, 1993, the
court entered judgment against Geller in the amount of $149,000,
representing fees and costs incurred by CSICOP in defending this action.
Geller appeals from this entry of judgment of Rule 11 sanctions.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Although both parties correctly agree that this court has jurisdiction to hear
this appeal, CSICOP argues that, in light of Geller's post judgment conduct, we
should decline to exercise that jurisdiction. CSICOP asserts that, since entry of
judgment by the district court, Geller has neither satisfied the judgment nor
posted an appropriate bond, and that he has secreted his assets abroad in an
attempt to abuse judicial processes. Consequently, because Geller has allegedly
flouted judicial authority, he should not be allowed to prosecute this appeal.

In support of its argument, CSICOP analogizes to the doctrine of ``fugitive
disentitlement,'' in which fugitive criminal defendants have been denied an
appeal for failure to submit themselves to lawful criminal authorities. See
Malinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365 (discretionary refusal by appellate court
to entertain appeal of fugitive convict); In re Assets of Martin, 1 F.3d 1351,
1356 (3rd Cir. 1993) (``[I]f a defendant is not willing to suffer the penalties of
the crime, then an appellate court should not afford the defendant an
opportunity to improve his or her position by challenging the validity of the
conviction.''). Relying on this ``simple principle of mutuality,'' CSICOP argues
that this court should exercise discretion not to hear Geller's appeal because
he has not satisfied the lower court's sanctions judgment and has placed
himself and his assets beyond the reach of the district court's authority.

Although CSICOP's argument appears to have at least facial appeal, we need
not decide whether we possess the discretion supposed by CSICOP. CSICOP's
argument is not truly jurisdictional; indeed, as both parties concede, this court
has jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988) (appeals from
final orders of the district court), Because we have crossed the jurisdictional
threshold, we may reach the merits of this dispute without considering
appellee's invitation to decline jurisdiction in our supposed discretion; and
because the merits of this case so clearly favor CSICOP, the party inviting this
court to decline jurisdiction, we need not detain ourselves with CSICOP's
invitation, and turn instead to the merits of Geller's appeal.1

B. Rule 11 Sanctions

Although Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was revised
effective December 1, 1993, the district court imposed sanctions under the pre-
revision rule; thus, our review is limited to that former rule, which
provided, in relevant part:

Every pleading, motion and other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorneys individual
name, whose address shall be stated. . . . The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading,
motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. . . . If a
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court,
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or
other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (1993).

In reviewing the district courts imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, our
review is limited to a determination of whether the district court abused its
discretion. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1989). In this
case, the district court imposed Rule 11 sanctions by default under Local Rule
108(b), which provides:

Within 11 days of the date of service or at such other time as the court may
direct, an opposing party shall serve and file a memorandum of points and
authorities in opposition to the motion. If such a memorandum is not filed
within the prescribed time, the court may treat the motion as conceded.

D.D.C. R. 108(b). The court treated the motion for sanctions as conceded when
Geller failed to respond to the motion within the time period prescribed by
the rule.

Geller claims that the district court abused its discretion in treating CSICOP's
sanctions motion as conceded because a plain reading of Rule 11 indicates that
sanctions should not be granted by default or concession. Rule 11 requires a
"pleading, motion or other paper" to be filed in violation of the rule before
sanctions can be granted. Geller maintains that this requirement is not met
here because no such paper or motion was filed, but that, in fact, he was
sanctioned because he failed to file a response to CSlCOP's motion. Geller's
argument mischaracterizes the district court's decision, however. In support
of its initial motion for sanctions, CSICOP complained that "Geller has not a
shred of factual or legal support for the allegations in his Complaint that
CSICOP can be held legally responsible for statements made by Randi without
its knowledge or authorization." Joint Appendix, Vol. 1, at 90-91. As this
allegation makes clear, CSICOP's request for sanctions was directed at the
filing of Geller's initial complaint. When Geller failed to respond to the
sanctions motion, the trial court concluded that he had effectively conceded
under Local Rule 108(b) that his original complaint was not well grounded in
fact or warranted by law. Consequently, the sanctions were not based upon
Geller's failure to answer; rather, they were based upon Geller's filing of a
frivolous complaint. Rather than finding Geller's failure to answer to be a
sanctionable act, the court, at most, treated it as a concession that he had, in
fact, filed such a complaint.

Rule 11 expressly authorizes sanctions for groundless complaints when it
states that if "a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this
rule, the court . . . shall impose upon the party who signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (1993) (emphasis
added); see Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 409 (affirming sanctions against law firm
for filing of frivolous antitrust complaint). We find nothing in the Rule that
limits its applicability in cases in which a party fails to respond to a motion for
sanctions. On the contrary, we conclude that, under District of Columbia local
rules, a party can be sanctioned for a Rule 11 violation if that party fails to
respond to a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. See D.D.C. R. 108(b). Local Rule
108(b) is a rule of neutral applicability; it is not qualified in any way by the
language of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure---it applies
equally when a party fails to respond to a Rule 11 motion. We think it would
be absurd to allow a party to concede an entire case by default while restricting
the same party's ability to concede a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. See Moy v.
Howard Univ., 843 F.2d 1504, 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (dicta) (party may concede a
motion for summary judgment under Local Rule 108(b) by failing to
respond); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 (governing default judgments).
Consequently, the district court properly treated CSICOP's sanctions motion
as conceded by Geller under Local Rule 108(b).

Turning to the underlying complaint, Geller argues that the complaint, was
indeed well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law under a theory of
"apparent agency." Based upon our discussion of Local Rule 108(b), however,
we need not reach this argument. Regardless of the merit of this claim, Geller
cannot raise it now. The proper time for Geller to have raised this defense
would have been in responding to CSICOP's motion for summary judgment.
See Weil v. Seltzer 873 F.2d 1453,1459 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (concession of motion
under Local Rule 108(b) acts as waiver; party cannot raise conceded argument
on appeal). When Geller failed to respond, he conceded a violation of Rule 11
under Local Rule 108(b); he cannot now argue the merits of his Rule 11
defense.

Finally, Geller complains that the district court's imposition of sanctions
should be overturned because it is not adequately supported by findings of
fact. We agree that, in cases in which a motion for sanctions is opposed, our
review is aided when a trial court supports a sanctions order by "explicit
findings of fact on either the exact basis underlying the sanctions or the
reasonableness of the exact sanction chosen" Confederate Memorial Ass'n v.
Hines, 995 F.2d 295, 301 (D.C. Cir 1993). Under these circumstances, however,
we are unwilling to mandate such findings of fact to support the district
court's order. In this case, the district court's basis for imposing sanctions is
obvious. In its sanctions order, the district court handwrote the word
``unopposed'' in its description of CSICOP's sanctions motion. Later, in its
denial of Geller's motion for reconsideration, the district court explained that
it had treated the motion as conceded under Local Rule 108(b). Thus, the court
treated the allegations in support of CSICOP's motion as true. The district
court's reliance upon Local Rule 108(b) provides us a basis to determine the
sanctions order to be reasonable. The reasonableness of the specific sanction
levelled against Geller was conceded by him.

We find ample support for the district court's imposition of sanctions against
Geller. Rule 11 expressly authorizes the imposition of sanctions against a
"represented party" for violation of the rule. As the advisory committee notes
to Rule 11 state, ``Even though it is the attorney whose signature violates the
rule, it may be appropriate under the circumstances of the case to impose a
sanction on the client.'' Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes to 1983
amendment (citing Browning Debenture Holders' Committee v. DASA Corp.,
660 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977)). Given Geller's litigious history, we find no abuse
of discretion in this direct imposition of sanctions. The district court properly
treated the sanctions motion as conceded by Geller under Local Rule 108(b).
Although the size of the sanction is substantial, we find no abuse of discretion
here, given the aggravated facts before the district court. Accordingly, the
judgment of the district court is
Affirmed.


Editor's Note: In a previous issue of Skeptical Briefs (December 1993) I
described how the enjoyment of our victories in court---such as the one
above, were somewhat tempered by the reality that we still have not collected
a cent of the sanctions award ($150,000 plus interest). I repeat a statement I
made in December 1993: It doesn't appear likely that Geller is going to send us
a check anytime soon.

We are determined to do what we can to collect, but the legal battle continues
and, indeed, may escalate. The Associated Press reports that Geller's attorney,
Richard Winelander, said that he would ask the full appeals court to
reconsider the case and that he will apply to the Supreme Court if he loses.
Geller has already lost a decision in the District Court, two motions for
reconsideration in the District Court, and this latest decision by the U.S. Court
of Appeals. It seems that whenever we take one step forward we are forced to
talk half a step back.

As always the lawyers need to be paid, and the decision in the appeals court
does not negate our responsibility for these costs. At the time of this writing
CSICOP owes close to $15,000 in legal fees dating back to May 1994, and the
amount will only increase. Our total legal bill is well over $250,000. I hope
you will consider making a contribution to the CSICOP Legal Defense Fund
today.