Article 16237 of alt.activism Subject INTRO +quot;Foreign Relations of the U.S., Vol 4, Vi
Article 16237 of alt.activism:
From: dave@ratmandu.esd.sgi.com (dave "who can do? ratmandu!" ratcliffe)
Newsgroups: alt.activism,alt.conspiracy.jfk,alt.conspiracy
Subject: INTRO: "Foreign Relations of the U.S., Vol 4, Vietnam Aug-Dec'63"
Keywords: if we don't read available books, it won't matter about the rest
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Date: 25 Feb 92 14:31:41 GMT
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I recently purchased an amazing resource, sections of which I want to
share. It is a new volume in the "Foreign Relations of the United
States" (FRUS) series, published by the U.S. Government Printing Office.
This is "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume IV,
Vietnam August-December 1963" published in 1991. It contains hundreds
of pages of documents which, taken as a whole, constitute the record of
the formulation of U.S. foreign policy with regard to Vietnam during
the uniquely critical period of August-December, 1963. In this volume,
each document has its own number and is listed chronologically.
The first paragraph of the Preface (included below in this post) lays
out the basis for this official record:
The publication Foreign Relations of the United States constitutes
the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The
volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security
considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of
the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with
appropriate materials concerning the facts that contributed to the
formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of
State are supplemented by papers from other government agencies involved
in the formulation of foreign policy. This volume also includes
documents from the private collections of various government officials
connected with U.S. policy toward Vietnam.
Initially, I will be posting ascii-versions of the following documents:
194. National Security Action Memorandum No. 263
this is the 10/11/63 NSAM that recorded JFK's approval of
withdrawing 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963,
as well as other recommendations from the Taylor/McNamara Memo
(document #167, 10/2/63, listed below) which included withdrawal
of "the bulk of U.S. personnel by . . . the end of 1965."
167. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (Taylor) and the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)
to the President
NSAM #263 (document #194, above) approves Section I B (1-3)
of this Memorandum created as a result of the Taylor/McNamara
trip to South Vietnam in late September-beginning of October.
169. Summary Record of the 519th Meeting of the National
Security Council, White House, Washington, October 2,
1963, 6 p.m.
More background on the policy decision made in light of the
Taylor/McNamara Report presented to JFK earlier in the day.
170. Record of Action No. 2472, Taken at the 519th Meeting of
the National Security Council, Washington, October 2, 1963
NSC confirmation of the endorsements made by JFK of the Taylor/
McNamara Report.
179. Memorandum for the Files of a Conference With the
President, White House, Washington, October 5, 1963
NSAM #263 directly refers to this Memorandum.
181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in
Vietnam
NSAM #263 directly refers to this Telegram.
331. National Security Action Memorandum No. 273
this is the 11/26/63 NSAM that initiated LBJ's alteration of the
plans JFK had been implementing for the U.S. withdrawal from
Vietnam.
321. Memorandum of Discussion at the Special Meeting on
Vietnam, Honolulu, November 20, 1963
NSAM #273 is purported to have grown out of the discussion
that took place in Honolulu on 11/20/63 with the majority of
the Kennedy cabinet in attendance.
* * * * * * * * *
Today in the major media, the mouthpieces for the lords of the official
reality consortium are constantly complaining about how Oliver Stone is
engaged in flights of fantasy when he says that JFK was beginning the
process of getting the United States out of Vietnam by the time he was
murdered. They misinform and disinform the public when they claim there
is no such record of this, and that no one can really say what Kennedy
was planning to do. They are either ignorant of what *is* available in
the public record--indicating unequivocably and precisely what JFK *was*
planning to do--or they are aware of the documentation but are willfully
and actively engaged in a campaign to keep the public ignorant about the
documents that *already* have been released.
The present day mainstream press--rather than fulfilling its original
role of "watchdog" and "fourth estate of the government" bringing to
public attention what the government is up to--is acting like nothing so
much as a mouthpiece for the state, making sweeping pronouncements
littered with falsehoods and saying more about their actual objectives by
what they omit than what they include. They are another component of the
sorry state of "checkbook democracy" we currently "enjoy".
I had the occassion to discuss some of the rich details included in this
FRUS volume with Fletcher Prouty recently. We got into talking about
the current push to open up the sealed files from the House Select
Committee on Assassinations and documents still sealed from the Warren
Commission. He had this to say:
I was doing a TV show to Australia, live, night before last. And
there was a man from Los Angeles talking about the subject [JFK
and Vietnam], and, my word he hadn't even read this stuff. At the
end of the show the man from Australia--the host of the show--asked
me, "What do think is going to be the value of opening the files
with respect to the Kennedy murder?" And I said, "Well I can't see
it being worth a darn. Here we are listening to people who haven't
even cracked the books that *are* opened, and if they have, they
don't understand what's in them. I don't see that this will make a
damn bit of difference. If people aren't going to read books that
are available, why talk about reading books that aren't available?"
This is the key to the subject if people don't read the stuff--now
you've got this, you can see that 263 is all spelled out. All of
the meetings that were held--there were over 50 meetings held
before NSAM 263 was published. Well, here are these clowns that
are professors in college, important writers in big magazines, and
they haven't even read this stuff.
The remainder of this post includes the title page and following 22
pages including the Preface, Contents, List of Sources, List of
Abbreviations and List of Persons. It is felt this beginning segment
of the volume will be useful to convey what this volume contains and
offers to the reader. I urge any of you interested in reading the full
record for yourselves to contact the Government Printing Office in W.D.C.
at 202/783-3238 and ask to speak to the Superintendent of Documents.
You want to request a copy of "DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION #9857."
You can purchase it ($30) with a credit card over the fown.
In the Preface below the explication of use of font-type is significant:
"Obvious typographical errors are corrected, but other mistakes and
omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a
correction is set in italic type (denoted in this ascii version with
asterisks just inside the two surrounding brackets --ratitor); an
omission in roman type. Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate
text that has been omitted because it deals with an unrelated subject
(in roman type) or because it remained classified after the
declassification review process (in italic type)."
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963
__________________________________________________________________
Volume IV
Vietnam August-December 1963
Editor in Chief John P. Glennon
Editor Edward C. Keefer
United States Government Printing Office
Washington
1991
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 9857
OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
__________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
Preface
The publication Foreign Relations of the United States constitutes
the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The
volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security
considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of
the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with
appropriate materials concerning the facts that contributed to the
formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of
State are supplemented by papers from other government agencies involved
in the formulation of foreign policy. This volume also includes
documents from the private collections of various government officials
connected with U.S. policy toward Vietnam.
The basic documentary diplomatic record printed in the volumes of
the series is edited by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public
Affairs, Department of State. The editing is guided by the principles
of historical objectivity and in accordance with the following official
guidance first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on
March 26, 1925:
There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without
indicating the place in the text where the deletion is made, and no
omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision.
Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over
what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain
omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:
a. To avoid publication of matters that would tend to impede
current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by
individuals and by foreign governments.
d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or
individuals.
e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not
acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one
qualification: in connection with major decisions it is desirable,
where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department
before the decision was made.
Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume IV
Document selection for this volume proceeded on the basis of a
research plan developed by the editors after a preliminary review of
repositories in both governmental and private agencies. From the outset
the editors approached their research realizing the need to supplement
the written record of U.S. policy during the Vietnam war with interviews
of officials who participated in the policy process. Early attention
was also given to those oral history interviews of participants already
in existence and available in various locations. Oral history citations
are provided in the footnotes to the text.
On the basis of their preliminary research and review of already-
published documentation, including the 1971 "Pentagon Papers," the
editors developed the following five areas of focus for the research and
selection of documents for inclusion in this volume: 1) Discussion and
formulation of policy in Washington; 2) Policy implementation in South
Vietnam; 3) The relationship among the United States Government, the
Diem government, and dissident elements in South Vietnam; 4) U.S.
intelligence assessments of the viability of the Diem government and the
prospects of potential coup plotters; and 5) U.S. military involvement
in Vietnam.
Discussion and formulation of policy in Washington: President John
F. Kennedy and, after his assassination on November 22, 1963, President
Lyndon B. Johnson, made the important policy decisions on Vietnam. They
received advice from the Washington foreign affairs community, either
orally at meetings or in documents. The records of these meetings with
the Presidents and advice provided to them in writing are the focus of
this volume. The editors are confident that they have had complete
access to all the Presidential written records bearing on Vietnam.
The most important repositories for records on the formulation of
U.S. policy toward Vietnam are the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson
Presidential Libraries. The records of the Department of State, to
which the editors had complete access, include a large segment of
Presidential and National Security Council documentation, but the
Kennedy and Johnson Libraries remain the single most comprehensive
sources. The papers of the President's Military Representative, General
Maxwell D. Taylor, at the National Defense University in Washington,
D.C., are also of unusual importance. The documents in the Taylor
Papers provide a unique record of Taylor's advice to the President on
Vietnam and records of some meetings both at the White House and at the
Department of Defense for which there are no other accounts. Department
of Defense records, especially files and papers of Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara, located at the Washington National Records Center,
are an important subsidiary source. A private collection, the W.
Averell Harriman Papers, are also of considerable interest. Used with
the permission of the late Ambassador Harriman when they were still in
his possession, they are now housed at the Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division. The Roger Hilsman papers, located at the Kennedy
Library, also proved an important source of documents not found in
official files.
Policy implementation in Vietnam: The editors also selected
documentation that covered the implementation of Presidentially-
established policy and a small range of lesser policy decisions that did
not reach the White House or were resolved in the Department of State or
other agencies of the foreign affairs community. The files of the
Department of State, the Kennedy and Johnson Libraries, and the United
States Information Agency are the primary documentary sources for these
decisions.
The relationship among the United States Government, the Diem
government, and dissident elements in South Vietnam: From late August
1963, when this volume begins, to the overthrow of the Diem government
on November 1, 1963, the United States strongly supported the Republic
of Vietnam, but the relationship was strained. The extensive reports of
U.S. Embassy relations with the Diem government come primarily from the
central files of the Department of State.
The fact that the United States was in close contact with dissident
elements in South Vietnam makes events in Saigon crucial to
understanding U.S. policy. The editors have, therefore, included a
considerable number of telegraphic reports from the Embassy and the
Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon on relations with
dissident Vietnamese. Central Intelligence Agency records were obtained
from the Kennedy Library, Department of State files, the Taylor Papers,
Department of Defense records, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff files. The
CIA provided full access to the Department historians to Agency
documents in the Presidential libraries, and many of these documents are
printed here. Some access was eventually provided to documentation
retained by the Agency itself, but too late for documents to be included
in this volume. Significant declassified material obtained from the CIA
archives for 1963 will be printed in a subsequent volume in the "Foreign
Relations" series.
U.S. intelligence estimates of the viability of the Diem government
and the potential prospects of coup plotters: The ability of the U.S.
Government to estimate the viability of the Diem government and the
prospects for potential coup plotters are of central importance during a
period in which there was extensive planning for a coup and then a
successful overthrow of President Diem. This volume and its companion,
documenting the first part of 1963 (volume III), include communications
between the Central Intelligence Agency and its Station in Saigon. In
addition to these telegrams, a representative selection of finished
intelligence assessments prepared by the U.S. intelligence community is
printed.
U.S. military involvement in Vietnam: The editors sought to include
documentation that illustrated the relationship between military
planning and strategy and the conduct of relations with the Republic of
Vietnam and other countries. No attempt was made to document
operational details of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. The Taylor
Papers, the files of the Secretary of Defense and the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs at the
Washington National Records Center, and the decentralized files of the
Department of State's Vietnam Working Group are the principal sources
for this topic.
The question of press coverage of developments in Vietnam and U.S.
involvement became less sensitive during the latter part of 1963, but
still remained an important issue. Documentation relating to public
affairs and press relations is located in the files of the United States
Information Agency.
The editors of the volume are confident that the documents printed
here provide a comprehensive and accurate foreign affairs record of
United States policy toward and involvement in Vietnam during the last
four months of 1963. The declassification review process for the
documents selected for this volume, outlined in more detail below,
resulted in withholding from publication only 1.7 percent of the
original manuscript.
The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the
National Archives and Records Administration's John F. Kennedy Library
and Lyndon B. Johnson Libraries, in particular Suzanne Forbes and David
Humphries. Susan Lemke at the National Defense University and Sandra
Meagher at the Department of Defense deserve special thanks, as do
former government officials who consented to oral history interviews for
this volume.
Editorial Methodology
The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington
time. Incoming telegrams from U.S. missions are placed according to
time of receipt in the Department of State or other receiving agency,
rather than the time of transmission; memoranda of conversation are
placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than
the date the memorandum was drafted. The editors were not always able
to determine the precise chronological order of documents produced
during periods of crisis and intense activity, particularly during the
November 1 coup. In these cases they used their best judgment.
Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign
Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by
guidance from the Editor in Chief and the chief technical editor. The
source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia
or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Obvious
typographical errors are corrected, but other mistakes and omissions in
the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is
set in italic type; an omission in roman type. Bracketed insertions
are also used to indicate text that has been omitted because it deals
with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or because it remained
classified after the declassification review process (in italic type).
The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the
number of lines or pages of source text that were omitted. All ellipses
and brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by
footnotes.
The first footnote to each document indicates the document's source,
original classification, distribution, and drafting information. The
source footnote also provides the background of important documents and
policies and indicates if the President and/or his major policy advisers
read it. Every effort has been made to determine if a document has been
previously published and this information has been included in the
source footnote. If two or more different accounts of a meeting or
event of comparable value are available and one or more is already
declassified and published, the editors chose to print the still
unpublished one and obtain its declassification.
Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent
material not printed in this volume, indicate the location of additional
documentary sources, provide references to important related documents
printed in other volumes, describe key events, and summarize and provide
citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed
documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand
accounts has been used when applicable to supplement the official
record.
Declassification Review Procedures
Declassification review of the documents selected for publication
was conducted by the Division of Historical Documents Review, Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, Department of State. The review was made in
accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act, and the
criteria established in Executive Order 12356 regarding:
1) military plans, weapons, or operations;
2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations,
projects, or plans relating to the national security;
3) foreign government information;
4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or
intelligence sources or methods;
5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;
6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to
national security;
7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or
facilities;
8) cryptology; and
9) a confidential source.
Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate
geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other
concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and appropriate foreign
governments regarding documents of those governments. The principle
guiding declassification review is to release as much information as is
consistent with contemporary requirements of national security and sound
foreign relations.
Edward C. Keefer compiled and edited the volume under the
supervision of Charles S. Sampson, the Vietnam project leader, and
Editor in Chief John P. Glennon. Suzanne E. Coffman of the Office of
the Historian prepared the lists of names and abbreviations. Rita M.
Baker performed the technical editing. Barbara A. Bacon of the
Publishing Services Division (Paul M. Washington, Chief) oversaw
production of the volume. Max Franke prepared the index.
William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs
Contents
Page
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III
List of Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI
List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XVII
List of Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXI
Vietnam
I. Reassessment in Washington and inaction in Saigon, August
28-September 7: The coup stalls, President Kennedy's
public statement, attempts to negotiate Nhu's removal and
change South Vietnam's policies . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. Period of interlude, September 7-0ctober 22: Assessment of
the progress of the war, U.S. efforts to reform the Diem
government, the McNamara-Taylor mission to Vietnam and
report, U.S. policy on coup plotting in Vietnam . . . . 133
III. The coup against the Diem government, October 23-November
2: Differing interpretations of U.S. policy toward coup
plotting, efforts to obtain information on a potential
coup, Lodge-Diem discussions, U.S. assessments of a
coup, the coup, the deaths of Nhu and Diem . . . . . . 427
IV. U.S. relations with the Provisional Government of Vietnam,
November 2-22: U.S. recognition of the Provisional
Government, the fate of remaining Ngo family members
and Tri Quang, U.S. advice to the new government,
rejection of a neutralized South Vietnam, the special
Honolulu meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 538
V. The Johnson presidency, November 22-December 31: Lodge-
Johnson meeting on Vietnam, NSAM 273, McNamara visit,
year-end observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 627
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 759
List of Sources
Unpublished Sources
Department of State
1. Subject-Numeric Indexed Central Files. In February 1963, the
Department changed its decimal central files to a subject-numeric
central file system. This volume and its companion, volume III, are the
first to be published in the Foreign Relations series in which the
Department's central files come exclusively from the new system. As
part of the transition from the old to two system, the Department of
State encouraged its indexers to cross references extensively and to
include the first page of the referenced document in the cross
referenced file. The system allows the researcher to begin in a basic
file and by noting the cross references discover other pertinent files.
The subject-numeric system was divided into broad categories:
Administration, Consular, Culture and Information, Economic, Poltical
[sic] and Defense, Science, and Social. Within each of these divisions
were subcategories. For example, Political and Defense contained four
subtopics: POL (politics), DEF (Defense), CSM (Communism), and INT
(Intelligence). Numerical subdivisions further defined them. For
example, POL 15-1 was used for documentation concerning the head of
state and/or the Executive Branch of any country. Therefore POL 15-1 S
VIET contains documentation on South Vietnam's President; POL 15-1 CAMB
would contain documentation of Cambodia's Head of State, Prince Norodom
Sihanouk.
The following were the principal files used in this volume:
POL S VIET and POL 1 S VIET, both containing background material
for general policy
POL 2 S VIET, general reports and statistics
POL 14 S VIET, elections
POL 15 S VIET, government
POL 15-1 S VIET, head of government/Executive branch
POL 16 S VIET, recognition of the new government
POL 18 S VIET, provincial and municipal government
POL 26 5 VIET, undesignated but used in Vietnam for coup planning
POL 27 5 VIET, military operations
POL 27-10 5 VIET, chemical weapons
POL 30-15 VIET, asylum.
POL 27 VIET, military operations
POL 32-4 VIET, territorial waters
The system could also combine two countries or a country and an
indivudual [sic]. Files of these types cited in this volume were:
POL 8 S VIET-US, U.S.-South Vietnmese [sic] discussions of
neutralism and non-alignment
POL US-MCNAMARA and POL 7 US-MCNAMARA, documentation relating to
the Secretary of Defense generally and to his trips
POL CAMB-S VIET, general South Vietnamese-Cambodian relations
POL 27-13 CAMB, Cambodia's neutrality in the Vietnam war
The POL Files comprise the most cited sources in the volume, but
there are other files containing important documentation. Much of the
documention [sic] on the Buddhist opposition to the Diem government are
found in the social category, SOC (social relations) 12-1 S VIET,
churches and sects including clergy (bonzes) and SOC 14-1 5 VIET,
general human rights policies in South Vietnam. Most military-related
documents were in DEF 19 S VIET, the general file for military
assistance to Vietnam or in DEF 19 US-S VIET, U.S. military assistance
to South Vietnam. The CSM S VIET file was surprisingly sparse,
indicating that it was little used by indexers during this period.
Documentation on economic assistance was found almost exclusively in AID
(US) S VIET. ORG 7 OSD is a administrative file used for the visits of
Secretary of Defense McNamara; PER-LODGE, HENRY CABOT is Ambassador
Lodge's personnel file; INF 8 US is the basic psychological operations
file; FT 1 S VIET is the general policy file for South Vietnam's
finances.
2. Lot Files. Documents from the central files have been
supplemented by materials from decentralized office files, the lot files
of the Department of State. A list of the major lot files used or
consulted follows:
Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240
Files of William P. Bundy for the 1960s, first as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and then
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs after 1964.
Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110
Collection of documentation on international conferences abroad
attended by the President, the Secretary of State, and other U.S.
officials, May 1961-December 1964.
Har-Van Files
Files created for Ambassador Averell Harriman and Cyrus Vance,
Delegates to the Paris Peace Conference in 1968. Background
documents beginning in the early 1960s. The file contains texts of
documents found nowhere else.
Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204
Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of
foreign governments, 1953-1964, as maintained by the Excecutive [sic]
Secretariat.
Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149
Cleared memoranda of Presidential conversations with foreign vistors,
[sic] 1956-1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.
Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192
Files of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 1961-1969, including texts of
speeches, miscellaneous correspondence files, White House
correspondence, chronological files, and memoranda of telephone
conversations.
Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330
Memoranda of the Secretaries of State and Under Secretaries of State,
1961-1964
Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147
Records of the Secretary of State's Staff Meetings, 1961-1963, and
additional ad hoc meetings, reports, papers, and memoranda of Chester
Bowles' telphone [sic] conversations.
S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199
Files of the Policy Planning Council for the years 1963-1964.
Special Group for Counterinsurgency Files: Lot 68 D 451
Minutes and memoranda of the Special Group for Counterinsurgency,
January 1962-December 1963.
S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265
Master set of papers pertaining to National Security Council
meetings, including policy papers, position papers, and
administrative documents for the years 1961-1966, as maintained by
the Executive Secretariat.
S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316
Master file of National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs) for the
years 1961-1968, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. S/S-NSC
(Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95
Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council
documentation, including NSC Records of Action, 1947-1963, as
maintained by the Executive Secretariat.
Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 67 D 54
Files of the interagency Vietnam Working Group, 1963-1964.
Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219
Top Secret files of the interagency Vietnam Working Group, 1963-1967.
National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.
Record Group 46, Records of the U.S. Senate
Files of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Record Group 59
Files of the Office of Public Opinion Studies, Bureau of Public
Affairs, Department of State
Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland
Record Group 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the United
States
Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 67 A 677
Classified records of the Embassy in Saigon for the years 1962-1963
(formerly Lot 66 F 57).
Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159
Top Secret files of the Embassy in Saigon for the years 1955-1963.
Record Group 306, Records of the United States Information Agency
USIA/IOP Files: FRC 67 A 222
Subject files of the Office of Policy for the years 1963-1965.
Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
McNamara Files: FRC 31 A 3470
Files of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara for the years 1961-
1968.
OSD Files: FRC 69 A 3131
Official records of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of
Defense, and Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary
for 1963.
OSD Files: FRC 71 A 6489
Miscellaneous records of the Secretary, Deputy Secretary of Defense,
and their assistants for the years 1951, n. 1966.
Record Group 334, Records of Interservice
Records of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 1962 and after.
National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
Taylor Papers
Papers of General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff of the Army,
1955-1959; Military Adviser to the President, 1961-1962; Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1962-1964.
John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts
Hilsman Papers
National Security Files
Chester V. Clifton Series
Departments and Agencies Series
Meetings and Memoranda Series
Regional Security Series
Trip and Conference Series
Country Series, Vietnam
President's Appointment Book (cited as President's Log Book)
President's Office Files
Staff Memoranda
Vietnam Security
Schlesinger Papers
Sorenson Papers
Thompson Papers
Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas
Papers of President Lyndon B. Johnson, National Security File
Heads of Staff Correspondence
Meeting Notes
Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy
NSAMs
Country File, Vietnam
Rusk Appointment Book
Vice Presidential Security File
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.
Harriman Papers
Special Files of W. Averell Harriman, Public Service, Kennedy and
Johnson administrations
Published Sources
Documentary Collection, Congressional Documents, and Periodicals
"The Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog" and microfiche.
Woodbridge, CT: Research Publications (formerly Washington:
Carrollton Press), 1977 onwards.
"The Pentagon Papers: The Department of Defense History of United
States Decisionmaking on Vietnam" [The Senator Gravel Edition].
4 vols. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.
U.S. Department of Defense. "United States-Vietnam Relations,
1945-1967" [The Pentagon Papers]. 12 vols. Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1971.
U.S. Department of State. "American Foreign Policy: Current
Documents, 1963." Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1967.
_______. Department of State "Bulletin," 1963. Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1963.
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. "Public Papers
of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963."
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964.
U.S. Senate. "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign
Leaders. An Interim Report of the Select Committee To Study
Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities."
U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 94-465.
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975.
Memoirs
Note: The Department of State takes no responsibility for the
accuracy of these memoirs nor endorses their interpretation of the
events.
Ball, George. "The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs." New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 1982.
Colby, William, and Forbath, Peter. "Honorable Men: My Life in the
CIA." New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978.
Galbraith, John Kenneth. "Ambassador's Journal: A Personal Account
of the Kennedy Years." Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969.
Hilsman, Roger. "To Move a Nation." Garden City, NY: Doubleday &
Co., 1967.
Johnson, Lyndon Baines. "The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the
Presidency," 1963-1969. New York: Holt, Reinhardt and Winston,
1971.
Mecklin, John. "Mission in Torment." Garden City, NY: Doubleday &
Co., 1965.
Nolting, Frederick E. "From Trust to Tragedy: The Political
Memoirs of Frederick Nolting, Kennedy's Ambassador to Diem's
Vietnam." Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1988.
Salinger, Pierre. "With Kennedy." Garden City, NY: Doubleday &
Co., 1966.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. "A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in
the White House." Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965.
Sorenson, Theodore C. "Kennedy." New York: Harper & Row, 1965.
Taylor, Maxwell D. "Swords and Plowshares: A Memoir." New York:
W.W. Norton & Co., 1972.
Tran Van Don. "Our Endless War: Inside Vietnam." San Raphael, CA:
Presidio Press, 1978.
List of Abbreviations
"AAA," anti-aircraft artillery
"ABN," airborne
"AC&W," aircraft control and warning
"ACSI," Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence)
"addee," addressee
"Admino," series indicator for administrative telegrams from CINCPAC
"AF," Air Force
"AFCIN," Air Force Chief of Intelligence
"AFRS," Armed Forces Radio Service
"AID," Agency for International Development
"Aidto," series indicator for telegrams from the Agency for
International Development to its missions abroad
"Amb," Ambassador
"ammo," ammunition
"AP," Associated Press
"APC," armored personnel carrier
"ARPAC," U.S. Army, Pacific
"ARVN," Army of the Republic of Vietnam
"BG," Brigadier General
"bn," battalion
"CAS," Controlled American Source
"CG," Civil Guard
"ChiCom," Chinese Communists
"ChiNat," Chinese Nationalist
"CHMAAG," Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group
"CI," counterinsurgency; commercial imports
"CIA," Central Intelligence Agency
"CIB," Combined Intelligence Board
"CIDG," Citizen's Irregular Defense Group
"CINCPAC," Commander in Chief, Pacific
"CINCPACAF," Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force
"CINCPACFLT," Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
"CINCUSAPAC," Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific
"CIP," Commercial Import Program
"CM," Chairman's Memorandum
"Cmdr," Commander
"CNO," Chief of Naval Operations
"CO," Commanding Officer
"COMUSARPAC," Commander, United States Army, Pacific
"COMUSMACV," Commander, U.S. Military Advisory Command, Vietnam
"CONUS," continental United States
"COPROR," Committee on Province Rehabilitation
"CPSVN," Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam
"CSA," Chief of Staff, Army
"CSAF," Chief of Staff, Air Force
"CSCC," Coastal Surveillance Command Center
"CT," Country Team
"CVN," Central Vietnam
"CVTC," Confederation of Vietnamese Trade Congresses
"CY," calendar year
"DA," Department of the Army; Defense Attache; defense assistance
"DAC," Development Assistance Committee, Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development
"DCFBA," Director General of Budget and Foreign Aid
"DCI," Director of Central Intelligence
"DCM," Deputy Chief of Mission
"Deptel," Department of State telegram
"desp," despatch
"DGI," Director General of Information
"DIA," Defense Intelligence Agency
"dissem," dissemination
"DLF," Defense Loan Fund
"DMZ," demilitarized zone
"DOD," Department of Defense
"DOD/PRO," Public Relations Office, Department of Defense
"DRV," Democratic Republic of Vietnam
"DTG," date-time-group
"E & E," emergency and evacuation
"ECCO," Eastern Construction Company
"Embtel," Embassy telegram
"FAR," Forces Armees Royales (Royal Armed Forces, Laos)
"FBIS," Foreign Broadcast Information Service
"FE," Far East; Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
"FOS," follow-on spares
"FRC," Federal Records Center
"FSO," Foreign Service officer
"FY," fiscal year
"FYI," for your information
"G," Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs
"GAO," General Accounting Office
"G/PM," Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Politico-Military Affairs
"GVN," Government of Vietnam
"helo," helicopter
"HQS," headquarters
"HSAS," Headquarters, Support Activity, Saigon
"IAF," Far East Branch, United States Information Agency
"ICA," International Cooperation Administration
"ICC," International Control Commission
"ICSH," International Committee on Strategic Hamlets
"ILO," International Labor Organization
"INR," Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
"IOP," Office of Policy and Research, United States Information Agency
"ISA," Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs
"JAOC," Joint Air Operation Center
"JCS," Joint Chiefs of Staff
"JGS," Joint General Staff
"JOC," Joint Operations Center
"KIA," killed in action
"LAS," Long-Range Assistance Strategy
"LOC," lines of communication
"MA," military assistance
"MAAG," Military Assistance Advisory Group
"MACV," Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
"MAP," Military Assistance Program
"MEC," Military Executive Committee
"MRC," Military Revolutionary Council
"MSP," Mutual Security Program
"NACO," National Agricultural Credit Office
"NBC," National Broadcasting Company
"NCO," non-commissioned officer
"NCP," National Campaign Plan
"NEA," Near East and Africa; Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, Department of State
"NFLSVN," National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
"Niact," night action
"NIE," National Intelligence Estimate
"NLHX," Neo Lao Hak Xat
"NOA," new obligational authority
"Noforn," no foreign dissemination
"NRM," National Revolutionary Movement
"NSA," National Security Agency
"NSAM," National Security Action Memorandum
"NSC," National Security Council
"NVN," North Vietnam
"OASD," Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
"OCI," Office of Current Intelligence
"ODMA," Office of the Director for Military Assistance
"OPCON," operational control
"OPNL," operational
"OPSUM," Operations Summary
"P," piaster; Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
"PACAF," Pacific Air Force
"PACFLT," Pacific Fleet
"PACOM," Pacific Command
"PAO," Public Affairs Officer
"PCHT," packing, crating, handling, and transportation
"PIC," person in command
"P10," Public Information Officer
"PIOPS," public information operations
"PL," Pathet Lao; Public Law
"plt," platoon
"PNG," persona non grata
"POL," petroleum, oil, and lubricants
"POLAD," Political Adviser
"POW," prisoner of war
"psywar," psychological warfare
"psyops," psychological operations
"PTT," post, telephone, telegraph
"reftel," reference telegram
"RG," Record Group
"rgt," regiment
"RKG," Royal Khmer Government
"RLG," Royal Lao Government
"RVN," Republic of Vietnam
"RVNAF," Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
"S," Office of the Secretary of State
"SACSA," Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special
Activities, Joint Chiefs of Staff
"SDC," Self Defense Corps
"SEA," Southeast Asia; Office of Southeast Asian Affairs,
Department of State
"SEATO," Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
"SecDef," Secretary of Defense
"Secto," series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of
State or his party to the Department of State
"Secy," Secretary
"SEPES," Service des Etudes Politiques et Sociales (Political and
Social Studies Service)
"septel," separate telegram
"SFHCVN," Special Forces, High Command, Vietnam
"SH," Strategic Hamlet
"SOA," Office of South Asian Affairs, Department of State
"S/P," Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
"sqdn," squadron
"S/S," Executive Secretariat, Department of State
"Stat.," United States Statutes at Large
"SVN," South Vietnam
"TF/Saigon," Task Force in Saigon
"TF/SEA," Task Force on Southeast Asia
"TF/VN," Task Force on Vietnam
"TIAS," Treaties and Other International Agreements Series
"Toaid," series indicator for telegrams to the Agency for
International Development from its missions abroad
"TOC," Tactical Operations Center
"Tosec," series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State
or his party from the Department of State
"Tousi," series indicator for telegrams to the United States
Information Agency from its missions abroad
"UN," United Nations
"UNESCO," United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization
"UPI," United Press International
"USA," United States Army
"USAF," United States Air Force
"USASGV," United States Army Support Group, Vietnam
"USIA," United States Information Agency
"USIB," United States Intelligence Board
"USIS," United States Information Service
"Usito," series indicator for telegrams from the United States
Information Agency to its missions abroad
"USMACV," United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
"USMC," United States Marine Corps
"USN," United States Navy
"USOM," United States Operations Mission
"USSR," Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
"UST," United States Treaties
"VC," Viet Cong
"VM," Viet Minh
"VN," Vietnam
"VNAF," Vietnam Armed Forces; Vietnam Air Force
"VNMC," Vietnam Marine Corps
"VNN," Vietnam Navy
"VNQDD," Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (National Party of Vietnam)
"VNSF," Vietnamese Special Forces
"VNSFHC," Vietnamese Special Forces High Command
"VOA," Voice of America
"WG/VN," Working Group on Vietnam
"WSM," Women's Solidarity Movement
List of Persons
Alphand, Herve, French Ambassador to the United States
Alsop, Joseph, syndicated columnist
Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State
Barnett, Robert W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Economic Affairs from February 3, 1963
Bell, David E., Administrator of the Agency for International
Development and member of the Counterinsurgency Group
Blake, Lieutenant General Gordon A., USAF, Director of the
National Security Agency
Bohlen, Charles E., Ambassador to France
Bowles, Chester A., President's Special Representative, Adviser
on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs, and
Ambassador at Large until July 19, 1963; thereafter
Ambassador to India
Brent, Joseph L., Director, Operations Mission in Vietnam
Buffum, William B., Deputy Director of the Office of United
Nations Political and Social Affairs, Department of State,
until November 10, 1963; thereafter Director
Bui Diem, Dai Viet oppositionist
Bui Van Luong, Vietnamese Minister of the Interior
Bundy, McGeorge, President's Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs
Bundy, William P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs
Buu Hoi, Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States
Carroll Lieutenant General Joseph F., USAF, Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency
Carter, Lieutenant General Marshall S., USA, Deputy Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency
Church, Frank, Democratic Senator from Idaho; member of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Cleveland, Harlan, Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organization Affairs
Clifton, Major General Chester V., USA, President's Military Aide
Colby, William, Director of the Far East Division, Operations
Directorate, Central Intelligence Agency
Conlon, Thomas F., Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, Bureau of
Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, after September
1, 1963, and member of the Vietnam Working Group
Cooper, Chester L., Assistant for Policy Support to the Deputy
Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, until
November 1963; thereafter Assistant Deputy Director for Policy
Support
Couve de Murville, Maurice, French Foreign Minister
De Gaulle, Charles, President of France
Diem, see Ngo Dinh Diem
Dillon, C. Douglas, Secretary of the Treasury
Dingeman, Major James W., USA, Executive Secretary of the Special
Group for Counterinsurgency
Dinh, see Ton That Dinh
Do Mau, Colonel (after November 1963, Brigadier General), ARVN,
Military Security Service Chief; also political member of the
Executive Committee of the Military Revolutionary Council
Do Vang Ly, Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States after
September 30, 1963.
Don, see Tran Van Don
D'Orlandi Giovanni, Italian Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam
Dungan, Ralph A., President's Special Assistant
Duong Ngoc Lam, Colonel, ARVN, Director, Civil Guard/Self Defense
Corps
Duong Van Hieu, Assistant Director for Special Police of the
Republic of Vietnam until November 1, 1963
Duong Van ("Big") Minh, Major General (after November 4, 1963,
Lieutenant General), ARVN, Military Adviser to President Diem
until November 1, 1963; thereafter Chairman of the Executive
Committee of the Revolutionary Council; President of the
Provisional Government of the Republic of Vietnam after
November 4, 1963
Dutton, Frederick G., Assistant Secretary of State for
Congressional Affairs
Felt, Admiral Harry D., USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific
Forrestal Michael V., member, National Security Council Staff
Fraleigh, Albert S., Deputy Assistant Director for Rural Affairs,
Operations Mission in Vietnam
Fulbright, J. William, Democratic Senator from Arkansas and
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Gilpatric, Roswell L., Deputy Secretary of Defense and member of
the Counterinsurgency Group
Halberstam, David, "New York Times" correspondent in Vietnam
Harkins, General Paul D., USA, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam
Harriman, W. Averell, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs until April 3, 1963; thereafter Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs and Chairman of the Special Group
for Counterinsurgency
Helble, John J., Consul in Hue
Helms, Richard, Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence
Agency
Hieu, see Ngo Trong Hieu
Higgins, Marguerite, "New York Herald Tribune" correspondent
Hilsman, Roger, Jr., Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research until April 25, 1963; thereafter Assistant Secretary
of State for Far Eastern Affairs
Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; also
Chairman and General Secretary of Dang Lao Dong, Workers' Party
of Vietnam
Hoang Van Lac, Colonel, ARVN, Permanent Commissioner,
Interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets; Special
Commissioner for Strategic Hamlet Program
Hughes, Thomas L., Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research until April 28,1963; thereafter Director
Huynh Van Cao, Brigadier General, ARVN, IV Corps Commander
Imhof, Johannes, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of
State
Janow, Seymour J., Assistant Administrator for the Far East, Agency
for International Development
Johnson, Lyndon B., Vice President until November 22, 1963,
thereafter President
Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs
Jorden, William, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs
Kattenburg, Paul M., Deputy Director of the Office of Southeast
Asian Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of
State, and Chairman of the Vietnam Interdepartmental Working
Group from August 4, 1963
Kaysen, Carl, President's Deputy Assistant for National Security
Affairs
Kennedy, John F., President of the United States until November 22,
1963
Kennedy, Robert F., Attorney General
Kent, Colonel J. R., USA, Assistant Director, Far East Region,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs
Khanh, see Nguyen Khanh
Khiem, see Tran Thien Khiem
Khiet, see Tien Khiet
Khuong, see Nguyen Khuong
Kim, see Le Van Kim
Koren, Henry L. T., Director of the Office of Southeast Asian
Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
Krulak, Major General Victor H., USMC, Special Assistant for
Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, Joint Staff of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Ky, see Nguyen Cao Ky
La, see Nguyen Van La
Lac, see Hoang Van Lac
Lalouette, Roger, French Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam
Lansdale, Maj. Gen. Edward G., USAF, Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense
Lausche, Frank J., Democratic Senator from Ohio and Chairman of
the Far Eastern Subcommittee, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee
Le Quang Trieu, Special Forces Commander after November 1, 1963
Le Quang Tung, Colonel ARVN, Special Forces Commander until
November 1, 1963
Le Van Kim, Brigadier General (after November 1, 1963, Major
General), ARVN, Secretary General and Foreign Affairs member,
Executive Committee of the Military Revolutionary Council,
after November 1, 1963
Le Van Nghiem, Brigadier General ARVN, Commander, I Corps
Lippmann, Walter, columnist
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., Ambassador to South Vietnam from August
26, 1963
Luong, see Bui Van Luong
Mai Huu Xuan, Brigadier General (after November 1963, Major
General), ARVN, Commander, Quang training camp; member,
Executive Committee of the Military Revolutionary Council,
after November 1, 1963; Chief of National Police
Maneli Mieczyslaw, Polish member of the International Control
Commission
Manning, Robert J., Assistant Secretary of State for Public
Affairs
Mansfield, Mike, Democratic Senator from Montana; Majority Leader
and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Mau, see Vu Van Mau
McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence
McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense
Mecklin, John, Counselor for Public Affairs at the Embassy in
Vietnam
Mendenhall, Joseph A., United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Far
Eastern Affairs, Department of State, from June 23, 1963
Minh, see Duong Van Minh
Montgomery, James M., Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, Bureau of
Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, and member of the
Vietnam Working Group
Morse, Wayne, Democratic Senator from Oregon and member of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Murrow, Edward R., Director, United States Information Agency
Nes, David G., Deputy Chief of Mission in Saigon from December
1963
Nghiem, see Le Van Nghiem
Ngo Dinh Can, brother of President Diem
Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of Vietnam until November
1, 1963
Ngo Dinh Luyen, brother of President Diem; Ambassador of the
Republic of Vietnam to the United Kingdom until November 2,
1963
Ngo Dinh Nhu, brother of President Diem; Presidential Counselor
and Head of the Interministerial Committee for Strategic
Hamlets until November 1, 1963
Ngo Dinh Nhu, Madame (Tran Le Xuan), wife of Ngo Dinh Nhu and
member of the Vietnamese National Assembly; official hostess
for President Diem
Ngo Dinh Thuc, brother of President Diem; Archbishop of Hue
Ngo Trong Hieu, Vietnamese Minister of Civic Action until November
1, 1963
Nguyen Cao Ky, Lieutenant Colonel Vietnamese Air Force, Transport
Squadron Commander; Air Force Commander from December 17, 1963
Nguyen Dinh Thuan, Vietnamese Secretary of State at the Presidency
and Assistant Secretary of State for National Defense
Nguyen Khanh, Major General, ARVN, Commander of II Corps until
November 29 1963; thereafter Commander of IV Corps
Nguyen Khuong, Colonel ARVN, coup leader
Nguyen Luong, Vietnamese Minister of Finance
Nguyen Ngoc Tho, Vietnamese Vice President until November 4, 1963;
thereafter Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and National
Economy of the Provisional Government
Nguyen Van La, Major General, ARVN, Civil Guard Commander
Nguyen Van Thieu, Colonel (Brigadier General after November 1,
1963), ARVN, Commanding Officer of the 5th Infantry Division
Nhu, see Ngo Dinh Nhu
Nhu, Madame, see Ngo Dinh Nhu, Madame
Nolting, Frederick E., Jr., Ambassador to Vietnam until August 15,
1963
Pham Dang Lam, Secretary General of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry
until November 4,1963; thereafter Foreign Minister in the
Provisional Government
Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Phan Huy Quat, former Vietnamese Defense Minister under Bao Dai and
leader of Dai Viet Party
Phillips, Rufus C., Assistant Director for Rural Affairs, Operations
Mission in Vietnam
Reston, James, syndicated columnist
Rice, Edward E., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs
Richardson, John H., Chief of Central Intelligence Agency Station in
Saigon until October 5, 1963
Rostow, Walt W., Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman
of the Policy Planning Council
Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State
Salinger, Pierre E. G., President's Press Secretary
Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr., President's Special Assistant
Sheehan, Neil, United Press International correspondent in Vietnam
Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, Cambodian Chief of State
Smith, Bromley, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
Souvanna Phouma, Laotian Prime Minister
Stevenson, Adlai, Representative at the United Nations
Stilwell, Major General Richard G., USA, Assistant Chief of Staff
for Operations, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, from April
1963
Stoneman, Walter G., Director of the Office of Vietnam Affairs,
Bureau for the Far East/Vietnam, Agency for International
Development
Sullivan, William H., U.N. Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State, until April 28, 1963; thereafter Assistant
to the Under Secretary of State
Sylvester, Arthur, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
Tam Chau, bonze, member of Buddhist delegation from Hue; became
Chairman of the Intersect Committee for the Defense of Buddhism
Taylor, General Maxwell D., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Tho, see Nguyen Ngoc Tho
Thompson, Brigadier Robert G. K., head of the British Advisory
Mission in Vietnam
Thuan, see Nguyen Dinh Thuan
Thuc, see Ngo Dinh Thuc
Timmes, Major General Charles J., Chief of the Military Assistance
Advisory Group, Vietnam
Tinh Khiet, chief bonze in Hue
Ton That Dinh, Major General ARVN, Military Governor of Saigon,
August 21-November 1, 1963; thereafter Commander of III Corps,
Second Deputy Chairman of the Executive Committee of the
Military Revolutionary Council, and Minister of Public Security
of the Provisional Government
Tran Kim Tuyen, head of the Service des Etudes Politiques et
Sociales
Tran Le Quang, Vietnamese Minister of Rural Affairs until November
4, 1963; thereafter Minister of Rural Affairs of the
Provisional Government
Tran Le Xuan, see Ngo Dinh Nhu, Madame
Tran Thien Khiem, General, ARVN, Chief of Staff after November 1,
1963, Military Affairs member, Executive Committee of the
Military Revolutionary Council
Tran Tu Oai, Brigadier General, ARVN, Director of Psychological
Warfare, Vietamese [sic] Ministry of Defense; Chief of Public
Information; Minister of Information in the Provisional
Government after November 4, 1963
Tran Van Chuong, Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States until
August 22, 1963
Tran Van Don, Major General, ARVN, Commander of III Corps until July
1963; thereafter Commander of the Army of the Republic of
Vietnam; Acting Chief of the Joint General Staff after August
1963; First Deputy Chairman of the Executive Committee of the
Military Revolutionary Council after November 1, 1963; Minister
of National Defense after November 4, 1963
Tri Quang, bonze, Buddhist opposition leader
Trueheart, William C., Minister-Counselor and Deputy Chief of
Mission in Vietnam
Tung, see Le Quang Tung
Tuyen, see Tran Kim Tuyen
Unna, Warren, "Washington Post" correspondent
Vu Van Mau, Vietnamese Foreign Minister until August 22, 1963;
Ambassador to the United Kingdom after December 24, 1963
Wheeler, General Earle G., USA, Chief of Staff
Xuan, see Mai Huu Xuan
Zablocki Clement J., Democratic Representative from Wisconsin
and member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
--
daveus rattus
yer friendly neighborhood ratman
KOYAANISQATSI
ko.yan.nis.qatsi (from the Hopi Language) n. 1. crazy life. 2. life
in turmoil. 3. life out of balance. 4. life disintegrating.
5. a state of life that calls for another way of living.
Article 16236 of alt.activism:
From: dave@ratmandu.esd.sgi.com (dave "who can do? ratmandu!" ratcliffe)
Newsgroups: alt.activism,alt.conspiracy
Subject: memorandum by J.E. Hoover on 11/29/63 re: his meeting with LBJ
Keywords: J.E. Hoover's FBI "spoon fed" the Warren Comission its data
Message-ID: <1992Feb25.135308.14104@odin.corp.sgi.com>
Date: 25 Feb 92 13:53:08 GMT
Article-I.D.: odin.1992Feb25.135308.14104
Sender: news@odin.corp.sgi.com (Net News)
Organization: Silicon Graphics, Inc.
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Summary: The second half of this post includes the copy of a memorandum
written by J. Edgar Hoover immediately after he met w/LBJ in
the Oval Office seven days after President Kennedy had been
murdered. The first half analyzes some of the more remarkable
details of this memo.
In 1963, John Edgar Hoover and Lyndon Baines Johnson knew each other
very well. They had lived across the street from each other for the
past 19 years. A professional bureaucrat of formidable talents, a 29-
year-old Hoover was appointed director of the Bureau of Investigation
in 1924 (Hoover added "Federal" to the title in 1935) by then Attorney
General Harlan F. Stone to clean up a corrupt organization. During
WWII, President Roosevelt expanded the FBI's reach charging Hoover with
investigations of Nazi and Communist activities in the U.S. The Cold
War gave the Bureau new power and Hoover new glory. Hoover's dossiers
continued to grow as well as his command of Congress, his manipulation
and intimidation of the press, and his stature in the country. Hoover
supplied Joe McCarthy with a great deal of the ammunition which enabled
McCarthy to sustain his "crusade" far longer than would have been
possible without Hoover's connivance.
When Robert Kennedy became Attorney General in 1961, Hoover's
entrenched power-structures suffered a two-year, 10-month setback.
Long before 1961, Hoover had created a direct channel of communication
with whoever was the current occupant of the Oval Office--bypassing the
actual chain of command which went from the President, through the
Attorney General, to Director of the FBI.
When LBJ assumed the Presidency, Hoover's direct link into the White
House was re-established. Johnson's official relationship with Hoover
was enhanced by personal friendship as well. "As majority leader [in
the Senate], Johnson already had neen receiving a steady stream of
reports and dossiers from the Director . . . which he prized both as
a means of controlling difficult senators and as a gratification of
earthier instincts. For President Johnson, secrets were in themselves
perquisites of power . . . No chief executive praised the Director so
warmly. In an executive order exempting Hoover, then sixty nine, from
compulsory retirement at seventy, Johnson hailed him as `a quiet,
humble and magnificent public servant . . . a hero to millions of
citizens and an anathema to all evil men. . . . The nation cannot
afford to lose you . . . No other American, now or in our past, has
served the cause of justice so faithfully and so well' ("Johnson Hails
Hoover Service, Waives Compulsory Retirement," NYT, May 9, 1964)."
-- from "The Age of Surveillance, The Aims and Methods of America's
Political Intelligence System," by Frank Donner, (c) 1980, Knopf.
The following memorandum, written by Hoover immediately after his
meeting with President Johnson, just seven days after the assassination
of President Kennedy, is a remarkable document to say the least. There
is much information imparted in the memo regarding just how fluid and
unstable the cover story about who killed JFK still was shaping up to be
at that time. By analyzing the discrepancies between the story Hoover
briefed Johnson about on November 29th, and what the final cover story
handed down by the Warren Commission would claim almost a year later,
we can better appreciate the degree to which the final "official report"
was sculpted to fit the constraints the Commission was forced to adhere
to, regardless of the actual facts of the assassination.
This document is what is known in bureaucracy-speak as a "memo for the
record." It was a customary practice in the upper levels of the
bureaucracy in the days before electronic technology in Washington, D.C.
An official of high rank would usually return to her or his office
after such a meeting and dictate a memorandum of as many details of the
discussion as could be remembered. It was a way of recording one's own
professional dealings for future reference.
Hoover starts out recounting that Johnson brings up "the proposed group"
--what will become the Warren Commission--to study the report Hoover is
trying to complete by the end of the same day. This has been initiated
by Johnson to prevent an independent investigation by Congress of the
assassination (Reagan tried to do the same thing with the Tower
Commission). Johnson would publically announce the creation of the
Warren Commission later that same day. This was a critical move by
Johnson: by appointing the Warren Commission, they effectively bottled
up Bobby Kennedy, they bottled up the Senate, and they bottled up Texas.
The Tower Commission didn't succeed in pre-empting an investigation by
Congress. In the end, Warren Commission didn't either, but it did keep
the cork in place preventing any other "official" examination for well
over another decade.
It is interesting to note that of all the people listed at the bottom of
page one, retired General Lauris Norstad (who had been head of the NATO
forces at SHAPE headquarters in Europe before his retirement) was the
only one who somehow succeeded in not serving on this Presidential
Commission. Earl Warren did NOT want the job and had sent a memo ahead
to the Oval Office, before he answered LBJ's summons, stating he would
not participate in such a commission. But when push came to shove,
Johnson's formidable powers of persuasion turned Warren's no into a
yes. Apparently even such focused persuasion could not win Norstad's
agreement.
The six topic bullets at the bottom of page one are file listings. This
is important for anyone ever finding themself searching for documents
from the government through Freedom Of Information Act requests. This
type of listing is very useful beccause it lets you know that these
files exist, and that you might be able to find documents using this
method which you might not find (or even know about) any other way.
In the middle of the first paragraph on page 3, Hoover relates how the
Dallas police didn't even make a move to stop Ruby. This is a pretty
heavy line by Hoover. He implies the Dallas cops must have somehow
been in collusion to silence Oswald from living to stand trial. But
the implication is never fleshed out.
The second half of page three contains some of the most enlightening
statements of the whole memo. Hoover tells Johnson three shots were
fired. Johnson asks "if any were fired at him." This question goes
a long way towards explaining the duress under which he served as
president. LBJ had heard bullets flying overhead--he had been that
close to the action. It was completely out of keeping with the
standard security procedures the Secret Service employed to have any
such parade appearance be attended by *both* the president and the
vice president. Johnson heard the sounds of those guns very clearly
and the message they conveyed. He lived out the rest of his public
life always aware of their possible return. Not long before he died,
LBJ was interviewed by his friend and writer Leo Janos. In the July,
1973 issue of "The Atlantic Monthly," Janos relates that LBJ told him:
1. "that the assassination in Dallas had been part of a conspiracy;
2. "I never believed that Oswald acted alone . . .;
3. "we had been operating a damned Murder Inc. in the Carribean."
The presence of the vice president 2 cars behind the president in the
parade in Dallas was a fundamental breach of the level of security
normally adhered to by the Secret Service. He took the experience back
to the White House and never forgot its meaning. He could just as
easily be snuffed out if he ever got out of line.
Then there follows a most curious and confused explanation by Hoover of
the three shots fired: "the President was hit by the first and third
bullets and the second hit the Governor". Obviously Hoover did not yet
know about the injury suffered by James Tague. Tague's face was nicked
by a bullet fragment (or a fragment of the curb it hit) which missed
the limousene entirely and struck the curb at his feet, approximatety
160 feet past the location of the president's car. This shot would end
up having to be one of "the three bullets fired" in the official story.
Johnson then explicitly asks again "were they aimed at the President."
It would appear that LBJ needed repeated assurance by Hoover that no one
had intended to shoot him. Hoover then says a mouthful when he states
"I further advised him that we have also tested the fact you could fire
those three shots in three seconds." Apparently they did not yet
understand the implications of the Zapruder film (or perhaps they were
confident they would be successful in never allowing the public to gain
any kind of access to it) and that it would be used as a clock.
Probably the most confused statements Hoover recounts making are when
he describes for Johnson's benefit how Connally was hit: "I explained
that Connally turned to the President when the first shot was fired and
in that turning he got hit. The President then asked, if Connally had
not been in his seat, would the President have been hit by the second
shot. I said yes." All we can conclude about this muddled explanation
is that Hoover was doing his best to explain things that he himself did
not understand or appreciate the complexity of.
Hoover goes on to claim they found the gun and three shells on the fifth
floor. As you can see at this point, the number of variations on what
would become the official cover story are quite numerous. All of the
the facts of the assassination were working against them. They had
a story all worked out--3 seconds, 3 shots, fifth floor--and yet they
didn't know the facts.
Fletcher Prouty commented on this issue to me while we were discussing
this memo recently. "It reminds me so much of when the U-2 was lost and
the guys from NASA began to explain the U-2 flight until a couple of
days later when somebody told them, `hey--it wasn't a NASA flight, we
can't do it that way.' And they began to change the cover story. But
then Kruschev said, `look, I've got the pilot, I know the story.' The
U-2 boys used to work across the hall from me--I'd see them coming and
going--oh they were shattered, because their cover story had been
totally wrong. So Hoover is in the same kind of a box here--he is
trying to explain something that is nothing but a cover story, and
almost everytime he turns around, he finds theres another hole in it."
Near the end Johnson extolls the virtues of his relationship to Hoover
stating "I was more than head of the FBI - I was his brother and personal
friend; that he knew I did not want anything to happen to his family;
that he has more confidence in me than anybody in town." Pretty
laudatory words which substantiate the unusally close rapport these two
men had. Then Hoover writes that Johnson tells him "he would not embroil
me in a jurisdictional dispute. . . " This was the reference to Bobby
Kennedy and the pre-empting of any other legitimate, independent and
official investigation that would NOT be under the control of the FBI.
They would see to it that there would not be the kind of "rash of
investigations" Hoover said at the beginning of this meeting "would be a
three-ring circus."
It is a known fact that in his later years Hoover's meglomania
approached epic proportions. He had various reasons why he did not want
any independent investigation which would *not* be dependent upon his
agency for the collection of data and use of his investigative staff.
Johnson was feeling quite vulnerable in these first days and was
very dependent on Hoover to tell him what to do concerning how to
consolidate his position and "reassure" the nation the assassination
was not political in any way, but rather the random occurence of a lone
sick mind. That was the only approach to take if they wanted to avoid
having to deal with why Kennedy had been killed. By de-politicizing
the assassination, they were able to ignore the basic question of why.
This memorandum shows that the people in the federal government who were
responsible for creating the Warren Commission, and giving it only a
very selected and specific set of "data" by which they reached the
conclusions that became the official report, that they did not start
with the final cover story--they created it later because even Hoover
and Johnson didn't know about it a week after the event. They were still
making things up a week later. It goes back to the old truth that it's a
big mistake to overestimate the abilities and knowledge of people--even
in high office. They can make pretty stupid mistakes and then when they
have to recant their stories, you are left with the kind of contrivance
we know as the Warren Report.
--ratitor
--
daveus rattus
yer friendly neighborhood ratman
KOYAANISQATSI
ko.yan.nis.qatsi (from the Hopi Language) n. 1. crazy life. 2. life
in turmoil. 3. life out of balance. 4. life disintegrating.
5. a state of life that calls for another way of living.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON __, D.C.
1:39 p.m. November 29, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BELMONT
MR. MOHR
MR. CONRAD
MR. DE LOACH
MR. EVANS
MR. ROSEN
MR. SULLIVAN
The President called and asked if I am familiar with the proposed
group they are trying to get to study my report - two from the House,
two from the Senate, two from the courts, and a couple of outsiders. I
replied that I had not heard of that but had seen reports from the
Senate Investigating Committee.
The President stated he wanted to get by just with my file and my
report. I told him I thought it would be very bad to have a rash of
investigations. He then indicated the only way to stop it is to
appoint a high-level committee to evaluate my report and tell the House
and Senate not to go ahead with the investigation. I stated that would
be a three-ring circus.
The President then asked what I think about Allen Dulles, and I
replied that he is a good man. He then asked about John McCloy, and I
stated I am not as enthusiastic about McCloy, that he is a good man but
I am not so certain as to the matter of publicity he might want. The
President then mentioned General (Lauris) Norstad, and I said he is a
good man. He said in the House he might try (Hale) Boggs and (Gerald
R.) Ford and in the Senate (Richard B.) Russell and (John Sherman)
Cooper. I asked him about Cooper and he indicated Cooper of Kentucky
whom he described as a judicial man, stating he would not want (Jacob
K.) Javits. I agreed on this point. He then reiterated Ford of
Michigan, and I indicated I know of him but do not know him and had
never seen him except on television the other day and that he handled
himself well on television. I indicated that I do know Boggs.
Johnson, President Lyndon B.
Assassination of President John F. Kennedy
Presidential Commission on Assassination
of President John F. Kennedy
Security - Presidential
Presidential Conferences
Presidential Travel Security
Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, November 29, 1963
Conrad, DeLoach, Evans, Rosen, Sullivan
The President then mentioned that (Walter) Jenkins had told him that
I have designated Mr. DeLoach to work with them as he had on the Hill.
He indicated they appreciated that and just wanted to tell me they
consider Mr. DeLoach as high class as I do, and that they salute me for
knowing how to pick good men.
I advised the President that we hope to have the investigation
wrapped up today but probably won't have it before the first of the week
as an angle in Mexico is giving trouble - the matter of Oswald's getting
$6500 from the Cuban Embassy and coming back to this country with it;
that we are not able to prove that fact; that we have information he
was there on September 18 and we are able to prove he was in New Orleans
on that date; that a story came in changing the date to September 28
and he was in Mexico on the 28th. I related that the police have again
arrested Duran, a member of the Cuban Embassy; that they will hold her
two or three days; will confront her with the original informant; and
will also try a lie detector test on her.
The President then inquired if I pay any attention to the lie
detector test. I answered that I would not pay 100% attention to them;
that it was only a psychological asset in investigation; that I would
not want to be a part of sending a man to the chair on a lie detector
test. I explained that we have used them in bank investigations and a
person will confess before the lie detector test is finished, more or
less fearful it will show him guilty. I said the lie detector test has
this psychological advantage. I further stated that it is a misnomer to
call it a lie detector since the evaluation of the chart made by the
machine is made by a human being and any human being is apt to make the
wrong interpretation.
I stated, if Oswald had lived and had take a lie detector test, this
with the evidence we have would have added that much strength to the
case; that these is no question he is the man.
I also told him that Rubenstein down there has offered to take a lie
detector test but his lawyer must be consulted first; that I doubt the
lawyer will allow him to do so; that he has a West Coast lawyer
somewhat like the Edward Bennett Williams type and almost as much of a
shyster.
The President asked if we have any relationship between the two
(Oswald and Rubenstein) as yet. I replied that at the present time we have
- 2 -
Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, November 29, 1963
Conrad, DeLoach, Evans, Rosen, Sullivan
not; that there was a story that the fellow had been in Rubenstein's
nightclub but it has not been confirmed. I told the President that
Rubenstein is a very seedy character, had a bad record - street brawls,
fights, etc.; that in Dallas, if a fellow came into his nightclub and
could not pay his bill completely, Rubenstein would beat him up and
throw him out; that he did not drink or smoke; that he was an
egomaniac; that he likes to be in the limelight; knew all of the
police officers in the white light district; let them come in and get
food and liquor, etc.; and that is how I think he got into police
headquarters. I said if they ever made any move, the pictures did not
show it even when they saw him approach and he got right up to Oswald
and pressed the pistol against Oswald's stomach; that neither officer
on either side made any effort to grab Rubenstein - not until after the
pistol was fired. I said, secondly, the chief of police admits he moved
Oswald in the morning as a convenience and at the request of motion
picture people who wanted daylight. I said insofar as tying Rubenstein
and Oswald together, we have not yet done so; that there are a number
of stories which tied Oswald to the Civil Liberties Union in New York in
which he applied for membership and to the Fair Play for Cuba Committee
which is pro-Castro, directed by communists, and financed to some extent
by the Castro Government.
The President asked how many shots were fired, and I told him three.
He then asked if any were fired at him. I said no, that three shots
were fired at the President and we have them. I stated that our
ballistic experts were able to prove the shots were fired by this gun;
that the President was hit by the first and third bullets and the second
hit the Governor; that there were three shots; that one complete
bullet rolled out of the President's head; that it tore a large part of
the President's head off; that in trying to massage his heart on the
way into the hospital they loosened the bullet which fell on the
stretcher and we have that.
He then asked were they aimed at the President. I replied they were
aimed at the President, no question about that.
I further advised him that we have also tested the fact you could
fire those three shots in three seconds. I explained that there is a
story out that there must have been more than one man to fire several
shots but we have proven it could be done by one man.
The President then asked how it happened that Connally was hit. I
explained that Connally turned to the President when the first shot was
fired and in that turning he got hit. The President then asked, if
Connally had not been in his seat, would the President have been hit by
the second shot. I said yes.
- 3 -
Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, November 29, 1963
Conrad, DeLoach, Evans, Rosen, Sullivan
I related that on the fifth floor of the building where we found the
gun and the wrapping paper we found three empty shells that had been
fired and one that had not been fired. that he had four but didn't fire
the fourth; then threw the gun aside; went down the steps; was seen
by a police officer; the manager told the officer that Oswald was all
right, worked there; they let him go; he got on a bus; went to his
home and got a jacket; then came back downtown, walking; the police
officer who was killed stopped him, not knowing who he was; and he
fired and killed the police officer.
The President asked if we can prove that and I answered yes.
I further related that Oswald then walked another two blocks; went
to the theater; the woman selling tickets was so suspicious - said he
was carrying a gun when he went into the theater - that she notified the
police; the police and our man went in and located Oswald. I told him
they had quite a struggle with Oswald but that he was subdued and shown
out and taken to police headquarters.
I advised the President that apparently Oswald had come down the
steps from the fifth floor; that apparently the elevator was not used.
The President then indicated our conclusions are: (1) he is the one
who did it; (2) after the President was hit, Governor Connally was hit;
(3) the President would have been hit three times except for the fact
that Governor Connally turned after the first shot and was hit by the
second; (4) whether he was connected with the Cuban operation with
money we are trying to nail down. I told him that is what we are trying
to nail down; that we have copies of the correspondence; that none of
the letters dealt with any indication of violence or assassination;
that they were dealing with a visa to go back to Russia.
I advised the President that his wife had been very hostile, would
not cooperate and speaks only Russian; that yesterday she said , if we
could give assurance she would be allowed to remain in the country, she
would cooperate; and that I told our agents to give that assurance and
sent a Russian-speaking agent to Dallas last night to interview her. I
said I do not know whether or not she has any information but we would
learn what we could.
The President asked how Oswald had access to the fifth floor of the
building. I replied that he had access to all floors. The President
asked where was his office and I stated he did not have any particular
place; that he
- 4 -
Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, November 29, 1963
Conrad, DeLoach, Evans, Rosen, Sullivan
was not situated in any particular place; that he was just a general
packer of requisitions that came in for books from Dallas schools; that
he would have had proper access to the fifth and sixth floors whereas
usually the employees were down on lower floors. The President then
inquired if anybody saw him on the fifth floor, and I stated he was seen
by one of the workmen before the assassination.
The President then asked if we got a picture taken of him shooting
the gun and I said no. He asked what was the picture sold for $25,000,
and I advised him this was a picture of the parade showing Mrs. Kennedy
crawling out of the back seat; that there was no Secret Service Agent
on the back of the car; that in the past they have added steps on the
back of the car and usually had an agent on either side standing on the
bumper; that I did not know why this was not done - that the President
may have requested it; that the bubble top was not up but I understand
the bubble top was not worth anything because it was made entirely of
plastic; that I had learned much to my surprise that the Secret Service
does not have any armored cars.
The President asked if I have a bulletproof car and I told him I
most certainly have. I told him we use it here for my own use and,
whenever we have any raids, we make use of the bulletproof car on them.
I explained that it is a limousine which has been armorplated and that
it looks exactly like any other car. I stated I think the President
ought to have a bulletproof car; that from all I understand the Secret
Service has had two cars with metal plates underneath the car to take
care of hand grenades or bombs thrown out on the street. I said this is
European; that there have been several such attempts on DeGaulle's
life; but they do not do that in this country; that all assassinations
have been with guns; and for that reason I think very definitely the
President ought to always ride in a bulletproof car; that it certainly
would prevent anything like this ever happening again; but that I do
not mean a sniper could not snipe him from a window if he were exposed.
The President asked if I meant on his ranch he should be in a
bulletproof car. I said I would think so; that the little car we rode
around in when I was at the ranch should be bulletproofed; that it
ought to be done very quietly. I told him we have four bulletproof cars
in the Bureau: one on the West Coast, one in New York and two here. I
said this could be done quietly without publicity and without pictures
taken of it if handled properly and I think he should have one on his
ranch.
- 5 -
Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, November 29, 1963
Conrad, DeLoach, Evans, Rosen, Sullivan
The President then asked if I think all the entrances should be
guarded. I replied by all means, that he had almost to be in the
capacity of a so-called prisoner because without that security anything
could be done. I told him lots of phone calls had been received over
the last four or five days about threats on his life; that I talked to
the Attorney General about the funeral procession from the White House
to the Cathedral; that I was opposed to it. The President remarked
that the Secret Service told them not to but the family wanted to do it.
I stated that was what the Attorney General told me but I was very much
opposed to it. I further related that I saw the procession from the
Capitol to the White House on Pennsylvania and, while they had police
standing on the curbs, when the parade came, the police turned around
and looked at the parade.
The President then stated he is going to take every precaution he
can; that he wants to talk to me; and asked if I would put down my
thoughts. He stated I was more than head of the FBI - I was his brother
and personal friend; that he knew I did not want anything to happen to
his family; that he has more confidence in me than anybody in town;
that he would not embroil me in a jurisdictional dispute; but that he
did want to have my thoughts on the matter to advocate as his own
opinion.
I stated I would be glad to do this for him and that I would do
anything I can. The President expressed his appreciation.
Very truly yours,
[signed J. E. H.]
John Edgar Hoover
Director
- 6 -
Article 16238 of alt.activism:
From: dave@ratmandu.esd.sgi.com (dave "who can do? ratmandu!" ratcliffe)
Newsgroups: alt.activism,alt.conspiracy.jfk,alt.conspiracy
Subject: FRUS, Vietnam v.IV, Aug-Dec'63: NSAM #263 (document #194)
Keywords: an informed citizenry will behave in a responsible manner - Jefferson
Message-ID: <1992Feb25.143836.15031@odin.corp.sgi.com>
Date: 25 Feb 92 14:38:36 GMT
Sender: news@odin.corp.sgi.com (Net News)
Organization: Silicon Graphics, Inc.
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Nntp-Posting-Host: ratmandu.esd.sgi.com
NSAM #263 though very brief, was critical in setting down exactly what
President Kennedy had begun to implement with regard to rejecting the
pursuit of a military solution to the conflict in Vietnam. Although
this Memorandum is short, it directly refers to and builds from the
Taylor/McNamara report of October 2, 1963 (document #167 which follows
this post) as well as document numbers 179 and 181 (following #167).
NSAM #263 was signed by McGeorge Bundy, JFK's Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs. Bundy's role was very heavy in the Kennedy
administration in ways JFK, apparently, was not aware of. His
signature is also the only one at the bottom of NSAM #273, approved
by LBJ just 4 days after JFK was murdered. NSAM #273 was the first
evidence of changes in the policies President Kennedy had been putting
into place. It did not take long for the new administration to begin
to alter JFK's policies, even though LBJ's favorite and most commonly
use catch-phrase in the days and months after the assassination--as
well as during his own 1964 campaign--was "let us continue," the
implication being that Johnson's only interest was in continuing the
policies and agendas set forth by his predecessor.
__________________________________________________________________
194. National Security Action Memorandum No. 263 [1]
Washington, October 11, 1963.
TO
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT
South Vietnam
At a meeting on October 5, 1963,[2] the President considered
the recommendations contained in the report of Secretary McNamara
and General Taylor on their mission to South Vietnam.
The President approved the military recommendations contained
in Section I B (1-3) of the report, but directed that no formal
announcement be made of the implementation of plans to withdraw
1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963.
After discussion of the remaining recommendations of the
report, the President approved an instruction to Ambassador Lodge
which is set forth in State Department telegram No. 534 to
Saigon.[3]
McGeorge Bundy
___________
[1] Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAMs.
Top Secret; Eyes Only. The Director of Central Intelligence and
the Administrator of AID also received copies. Also printed in
United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 12, p. 578.
[2] See Document 179.
[3] Document 181.
--
daveus rattus
yer friendly neighborhood ratman
KOYAANISQATSI
ko.yan.nis.qatsi (from the Hopi Language) n. 1. crazy life. 2. life
in turmoil. 3. life out of balance. 4. life disintegrating.
5. a state of life that calls for another way of living.
Article 16239 of alt.activism:
From: dave@ratmandu.esd.sgi.com (dave "who can do? ratmandu!" ratcliffe)
Newsgroups: alt.activism,alt.conspiracy.jfk,alt.conspiracy
Subject: FRUS, Vietnam v.IV, Aug-Dec'63: Taylor/McNamara Report (doc. #167)
Keywords: if we don't read available books, it won't matter about the rest
Message-ID: <1992Feb25.144002.15093@odin.corp.sgi.com>
Date: 25 Feb 92 14:40:02 GMT
Sender: news@odin.corp.sgi.com (Net News)
Organization: Silicon Graphics, Inc.
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This is the complete "Report of McNamara-Taylor Mission to South
Vietnam". It was fundamental to National Security Action Memorandum
(NSAM) #263, approved by JFK on October 5, 1963. Kennedy approved the
military recommendations contained in Section I B (1-3), below. NSAM
#263 was the the culmination of many months of seeking a solution to
the yawning quagmire of Vietnam that Kennedy had concluded must not
be solved militarily by committing U.S. combat troops.
Kennedy had a great deal to do with the creation of this report. There
had been many months of work already completed before he ever even sent
McNamara and Taylor to Vietnam in late September to bring back the
"report" which had already been created from the visit Major General
Victor H. Krulak and a senior Foreign Service officer, Joseph
Mendenhall, made to Vietnam in early September under Kennedy's
direction. JFK knew exactly what he wanted it to say, and dispatched
Krulak knowing that he would come home with all the current data
essential for final decision-making. But Kennedy wanted to move the
decision level up to the top and so sent McNamara and Taylor. With
the McNamara/Taylor report--which Krulak's office wrote--that they
publically gave to JFK upon their return, Kennedy had effectively laid
the groundwork for the enunciation of his intended plans, formalized
three days later in NSAM #263.
__________________________________________________________________
167. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (Taylor) and the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)
to the President [1]
Washington, October 2, 1963.
SUBJECT
Report of McNamara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam
Your memorandum of 21 September 1963[2] directed that General
Taylor and Secretary McNamara proceed to South Vietnam to appraise
the military and para-military effort to defeat the Viet Cong and
to consider, in consultation with Ambassador Lodge, related
political and social questions. You further directed that, if the
prognosis in our judgment was not hopeful, we should present our
views of what action must be taken by the South Vietnam Government
and what steps our Government should take to lead the Vietnamese
to that action.
Accompanied by representatives of the State Department, CIA,
and your Staff, we have conducted an intensive program of visits
to key operational areas, supplemented by discussions with U.S.
officials in all major U.S. Agencies as well as officials of the
GVN and third countries.
We have also discussed our findings in detail with Ambassador
Lodge, and with General Harkins and Admiral Felt.
The following report is concurred in by the Staff Members of
the mission as individuals, subject to the exceptions noted.
I. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Conclusions.
1. The military campaign has made great progress and
continues to progress.
2. There are serious political tensions in Saigon (and
perhaps elsewhere in South Vietnam) where the Diem-Nhu government
is becoming increasingly unpopular.
3. There is no solid evidence of the possibility of a
successful coup, although assassination of Diem or Nhu is always a
possibility.
4. Although some, and perhaps an increasing number, of GVN
military officers are becoming hostile to the government, they are
more hostile to the Viet Cong than to the government and at least
for the near future they will continue to perform their military
duties.
5. Further repressive actions by Diem and Nhu could change
the present favorable military trends. On the other hand, a
return to more moderate methods of control and administration,
unlikely though it may be, would substantially mitigate the
political crisis.
6. It is not clear that pressures exerted by the U.S. will
move Diem and Nhu toward moderation. Indeed, pressures may
increase their obduracy. But unless such pressures are exerted,
they are almost certain to continue past patterns of behavior.
B. Recommendations.
We recommend that:
1. General Harkins review with Diem the military changes
necessary to complete the military campaign in the Northern and
Central areas (I, II, and III Corps) by the end of 1964, and in
the Delta (IV Corps) by the end of 1965. This review would
consider the need for such changes as:
a. A further shift of military emphasis and strength to the
Delta (IV Corps).
b. An increase in the military tempo in all corps areas, so
that all combat troops are in the field an average of 20 days out
of 30 and static missions are ended.
c. Emphasis on "clear and hold operations" instead of terrain
sweeps which have little permanent value.
d. The expansion of personnel in combat units to full
authorized strength.
e. The training and arming of hamlet militia to an
accelerated rate, especially in the Delta.
f. A consolidation of the strategic hamlet program,
especially in the Delta, and action to insure that future
strategic hamlets are not built until they can be protected, and
until civic action programs can be introduced.
2. A program be established to train Vietnamese so that
essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can
be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be
possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time.
3. In accordance with the program to train progressively
Vietnamese to take over military functions, the Defense Department
should announce in the very near future presently prepared plans
to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963. This
action should be explained in low key as an initial step in a
long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained
Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort.
4. The following actions be taken to impress upon Diem our
disapproval of his political program.
a. Continue to withhold commitment of funds in the commodity
import program, but avoid a formal announcement. The potential
significance of the withholding of commitments for the 1964
military budget should be brought home to the top military
officers in working level contacts between USOM and MACV and the
Joint General Staff; up to now we have stated $95 million may be
used by the Vietnamese as a planning level for the commodity
import program for 1964. Henceforth we could make clear that this
is uncertain both because of lack of final appropriation action by
the Congress and because of executive policy.
b. Suspend approval of the pending AID loans for the Saigon-
Cholon Waterworks and Saigon Electric Power Project. We should
state clearly that we are doing so as a matter of policy.
c. Advise Diem that MAP and CIA support for designated units,
now under Colonel Tung's control (mostly held in or near the
Saigon area for political reasons) will be cut off unless these
units are promptly assigned to the full authority of the Joint
General Staff and transferred to the field.
d. Maintain the present purely "correct" relations with the
top GVN, and specifically between the Ambassador and Diem.
Contact between General Harkins and Diem and Defense Secretary
Thuan on military matters should not, however, be suspended, as
this remains an important channel of advice. USOM and USIA should
also seek to maintain contacts where these are needed to push
forward programs in support of the effort in the field, while
taking care not to cut across the basic picture of U.S.
disapproval and uncertainty of U.S. aid intentions. We should
work with the Diem government but not support it.[3]
As we pursue these courses of action, the situation must be
closely watched to see what steps Diem is taking to reduce
repressive practices and to improve the effectiveness of the
military effort. We should set no fixed criteria, but recognize
that we would have to decide in 2-4 months whether to move to more
drastic action or try to carry on with Diem even if he had not
taken significant steps.
5. At this time, no initiative should be taken to encourage
actively a change in government. Our policy should be to seek
urgently to identify and build contacts with an alternative
leadership if and when it appears.
6. The following statement be approved as current U.S. policy
toward South Vietnam and constitute the substance of the
government position to be presented both in Congressional
testimony and in public statements.
a. The security of South Vietnam remains vital to United
States security. For this reason, we adhere to the overriding
objective of denying this country to Communism and of suppressing
the Viet Cong insurgency as promptly as possible. (By suppressing
the insurgency we mean reducing it to proportions manageable by
the national security forces of the GVN, unassisted by the
presence of U.S. military forces.) We believe the U.S. part of
the task can be completed by the end of 1965, the terminal date
which we are taking as the time objective of our counterinsurgency
programs.
b. The military program in Vietnam has made progress and is
sound in principle.
c. The political situation in Vietnam remains deeply serious.
It has not yet significantly affected the military effort, but
could do so at some time in the future. If the result is a GVN
ineffective in the conduct of the war, the U.S. will review its
attitude toward support for the government. Although we are
deeply concerned by repressive practices, effective performance in
the conduct of the war should be the determining factor in our
relations with the GVN.
d. The U.S. has expressed its disapproval of certain actions
of the Diem-Nhu regime and will do so again if required. Our
policy is to seek to bring about the abandonment of repression
because of its effect on the popular will to resist. Our means
consist of expressions of disapproval and the withholding of
support from GVN activities that are not clearly contributing to
the war effort. We will use these means as required to assure an
effective military program.
[Here follow Sections II, "Military Situation and Trends,"
III, "Economic Situation and Trends," IV, "Political Situation and
Trends," and V, "Effect on Political Tension."]
VI. OVERALL EVALUATION
From the above analysis it is clear that the situation
requires a constant effort by the U.S. to obtain a reduction of
political tensions and improved performance by the Vietnamese
Government. We cannot say with assurance whether the effort
against the Viet Cong will ultimately fail in the absence of major
political improvements. However, it does seem clear that after
another period of repressive action progress may be reduced and
indeed reversed. Although the present momentum might conceivably
continue to carry the effort forward even if Diem remains in power
and political tensions continue, any significant slowing in the
rate of progress would surely have a serious effect on U.S.
popular support for the U.S. effort.
VII. U.S. LEVERAGES TO OBTAIN DESIRED CHANGES IN THE
DIEM REGIME
A. Conduct of U.S. Representatives.
U.S. personnel in Saigon might adopt an attitude of coolness
toward their Vietnamese counterparts, maintaining only those
contacts and communications which are necessary for the actual
conduct of operations in the field. To some extent this is the
attitude already adopted by the Ambassador himself, but it could
be extended to the civilian and military agencies located in
Saigon. The effect of such action would be largely psychological.
B. Economic Leverage.
Together, USOM's Commodity Import Program (CIP) and the PL 480
program account for between 60 and 70 percent of imports into
Vietnam. The commitment of funds under the CIP has already been
suspended. CIP deliveries result in the generation of piastres,
most of which go to the support of the defense budget. It is
estimated that CIP pipelines will remain relatively large for some
five or six months, and within this time period there would not be
a serious material effect. Even within this period, however, the
flow of piastres to support the defense budget will gradually
begin to decline and the GVN will be forced to draw down its
foreign exchange reserves or curtail its military expenditures.
Within the domestic economy the existing large pipelines would
mean that there would be no material reason for inflation to begin
in the short term period. However, the psychological effect of
growing realization that the CIP program has been suspended might
be substantial in 2-4 months. Saigon has a large number of
speculative traders, and although there is considerable police
effort to control prices, this might not be able to contain a
general trend of speculation and hoarding. Once inflation did
develop, it could have a serious effect on the GVN budget and the
conduct of the war.
Apart from CIP, two major AID projects are up for final
approval--the Saigon-Cholon Waterworks ($9 million) and the Saigon
Electric Power Project ($4 million). Suspension of these projects
would be a possible means of demonstrating to Congress and the
world that we disapprove of GVN policies and are not providing
additional aid not directly essential to the war effort.
C. Paramilitary and Other Assistance.
(1) USOM assistance to the Combat Police and USOM and USIS
assistance to the Director General of Information and the ARVN
PsyWar Program could be suspended. These projects involve a
relatively small amount of local currency but their suspension,
particularly in the case of USIS, might adversely affect programs
which the U.S. wishes to see progress.
(2) However, there would be merit in a gesture aimed at
Colonel Tung, the Special Forces Commander, whose forces in or
near Saigon played a conspicuous part in the pagoda affair and are
a continuing support for Diem. Colonel Tung commands a mixed
complex of forces, some of which are supported by MAP and others
presently through CIA. All of those now in or near Saigon were
trained either for combat missions or for special operations into
North Vietnam and Laos. Purely on grounds of their not being used
for their proper missions, the U.S. could inform Diem that we
would cut off MAP and CIA support unless they were placed directly
under Joint General Staff and were committed to field operations.
The practical effect of the cut-off would probably be small.
The equipment cannot be taken out of the hands of the units, and
the pay provided to some units could be made up from the GVN
budget. Psychologically, however, the significance of the gesture
might be greater. At the least it would remove one target of
press criticism of the U.S., and would probably also be welcomed
by the high military officers in Vietnam, and certainly by the
disaffected groups in Saigon.
At the same time, support should continue, but through General
Harkins rather than CIA, for border surveillance and other similar
field operations that are contributing to the war effort.
We have weighed this cut-off action carefully. It runs a risk
that Colonel Tung would refuse to carry out external operations
against the Lao corridor and North Vietnam. It might also limit
CIA's access to the military. However, U.S. liaison with high
military officers could probably be fully maintained through the
U.S. military advisors. On balance, we conclude that these
possible disadvantages are outweighed by the gains implicit in
this action.
(3) Consideration has been given both by USOM and the
military (principally the JCS in Washington) to the possibility of
redirecting economic and military assistance in such a fashion as
to bypass the central government in Saigon. Military studies have
shown the technical feasibility, though with great difficulty and
cost, of supplying the war effort in the countryside over lines of
communications which do not involve Saigon, and it is assumed that
the same conclusions would apply to USOM deliveries to the filed
under the rural strategic hamlet program. However, there is a
consensus among U.S. agencies in Saigon that such an effort is not
practical in the face of determined opposition by the GVN unless,
of course, a situation had developed where the central government
was no longer in control of some areas of the country. Nor is it
at all clear that such diversion would operate to build up the
position of the military or to cut down Nhu's position.
D. Propaganda.
Although the capability of USIS to support the United States
campaign of pressure against the regime would be small, the
Ambassador believes consideration must be given to the content and
timing of the United States pronouncements outside the country.
He has already suggested the use of the Voice of America in
stimulating, in its broadcasts to Vietnamese, discussions of
democratic political philosophies. This medium could be used to
exploit a wide range of ascending political pressure. In
addition, a phased program of United States official
pronouncements could be developed for use in conjunction with the
other leverages as they are applied. We must recognize the
possibility that such actions may incite Diem to strong
countermeasures.
E. The Leverage of Conditioning Our Military Aid on Satisfactory
Progress.
Coupled with all the above there is the implicit leverage
embodied in our constantly making it plain to Diem and other that
the long term continuation of military aid is conditioned upon the
Vietnamese Government demonstrating a satisfactory level of
progress toward defeat of the insurgency.
F. Conclusions.
A program of limited pressures, such as the CIP suspension,
will not have large material effects on the GVN or the war effort,
at least for 2-4 months. The psychological effects could be
greater, and there is some evidence that the suspension is already
causing concern to Diem. However, the effect of pressures that
can be carried out over an extended period without detriment to
the war effort is probably limited with respect to the possibility
of Diem making necessary changes.
We have not analyzed with care what the effect might be of a
far more intensive level of pressure such as cessation of MAP
deliveries or long continued suspension of the commodity import
program. If the Diem government should fail to make major
improvements, serious consideration would have to be given to this
possible course of action, but we believe its effect on the war
effort would be so serious--in psychological if not in immediate
material terms--that it should not be undertaken at the present
time.
VIII. COUP POSSIBILITIES
A. Prospects of a Spontaneous Coup.
The prospects of an early spontaneous replacement of the Diem
Regime are not high. The two principal sources of such an
attempt, the senior military officers and the students, have both
been neutralized by a combination of their own inability and the
regime's effective countermeasures of control. The student
organizations have been emasculated. The students themselves have
displayed more emotion than determination and they are apparently
being handled with sufficient police sophistication to avoid an
explosion.
The generals appear to have little stomach for the difficult
job of secretly arranging the necessary coalescence of force to
upset the Regime.
Diem/Nhu are keenly aware of the capability of the generals to
take over the country, utilizing the tremendous power now vested
in the military forces. They, therefore, concentrate their
manipulative talent on the general officers, by transfers, and by
controls over key units and their locations. They are aware that
these actions may reduce efficiency, but they tolerate it rather
than risk the prospect that they be overthrown and their social
revolution frustrated. They have established a praetorian guard
to guarantee considerable bloodshed if any attack is made. The
generals have seen slim hope of surmounting these difficulties
without prohibitive risk to themselves, the unity of the Army and
the Establishment itself.
Despite these unfavorable prospects for action in the short
term, new factors could quickly arise, such as the death of Diem
or an unpredictable and even irrational attack launched by a
junior officer group, which would call urgently for U.S. support
or counteraction. In such a case, the best alternative would
appear to be the support of constitutional continuity in the
person of the Vice President, behind whom arrangements could be
developed for a more permanent replacement after a transitional
period.
B. Prospects for Improvement under an Alternative Government.
The prospects that a replacement regime would be an
improvement appear to be about 50-50.[4] Initially, only a
strongly authoritarian regime would be able to pull the government
together and maintain order. In view of the pre-eminent role of
the military in Vietnam today, it is probable that this role would
be filled by a military officer, perhaps taking power after the
selective process of a junta dispute. Such an authoritarian
military regime, perhaps after an initial period of euphoria at
the departure of Diem/Nhu, would be apt to entail a resumption of
the repression at least of Diem, the corruption of the Vietnamese
Establishment before Diem, and an emphasis on conventional
military rather than social, economic and political
considerations, with at least an equivalent degree of xenophobic
nationalism.
These features must be weighed, however, against the possible
results of growing dominance or succession by Nhu, which would
continue and even magnify the present dissension, unhappiness and
unrest.
C. Possible U.S. Actions.
Obviously, clear and explicit U.S. support could make a great
difference to the chances of a coup. However, at the present time
we lack a clear picture of what acceptable individuals might be
brought to the point of action, or what kind of government might
emerge. We therefore need an intensive clandestine effort, under
the Ambassador's direction, to establish necessary contacts to
allow the U.S. to continuously appraise coup prospects.
If and when we have a better picture, the choice will still
remain difficult whether we would prefer to take our chances on a
spontaneous coup (assuming some action by Diem and Nhu would
trigger it) or to risk U.S. prestige and having the U.S. hand show
with a coup group which appeared likely to be a better alternative
government. Any regime that was identified from the outset as a
U.S. "puppet" would have disadvantages both within South Vietnam
and in significant areas of the world, including other
underdeveloped nations where the U.S. has a major role.
In any case, whether or not it proves to be wise to promote a
coup at a later time, we must be ready for the possibility of a
spontaneous coup, and this too requires clandestine contacts on an
intensive basis.
IX. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES
Broadly speaking, we believe there are three alternative
policies the U.S. could pursue to achieve its political and
military objectives:
1. Return to avowed support of the Diem regime and attempt to
obtain the necessary improvements through persuasion from a
posture of "reconciliation." This would not mean any expression
of approval of the repressive actions of the regime, but simply
that we would go back in practice to business as usual.
2. Follow a policy of selective pressures: "purely correct"
relationships at the top official level, continuing to withhold
further actions in the commodity import program, and making clear
our disapproval of the regime. A further element in this policy
is letting the present impression stand that the U.S. would not be
averse to a change of Government--although we would not take any
immediate actions to initiate a coup.
3. Start immediately to prom